THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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THE EARTHQUAKE IN JAPAN

By the EDITOR.

IT has been said by a great writer that the fearful earthquake and tidal wave which in five minutes cost the lives of 50,000 persons in Lisbon in 1755, shook the belief of many men in God, and caused a wave of infidelity to pass over Western Europe. For not a few thoughtful and sympathetic persons felt that there could be but little love and but little wisdom in a Creator and Ruler of the Universe, Who could allow or was unable to prevent such catastrophes. And it is possible that the knowledge of the terrible earthquake which has just taken place in Japan, involving the loss of so many lives and such wholesale destruction of property, may produce a similar feeling in the case of some of those who have hearts to feel and minds to think.

Now we do not pretend in such a case to be able absolutely to justify the ways of God to man, for he who would justify absolutely any part of an infinite scheme must have infinite knowledge; but we do think it is possible to believe and to have good reason for believing that God is good and wise although such things happen, and we will try to explain why. In the first place, although this is not generally realised, the work of volcanic forces comprises very much more than the descriptions, which appear in the pages of the newspaper or of popular books of travel, would lead people to think. In fact, it would be as reasonable to view the letting off of steam by a railway engine as the whole work of that engine, and to regard

a volcanic eruption as the whole or even the chief function of volcanic forces. We read, perhaps, a graphic account by Bulwer Lytton of the overwhelming of Herculaneum and Pompeii, or a vivid description by Lady Brassey of the molten lake in the crater of Kilauea, or the sensational paragraphs of a newspaper correspondent dealing with the eruptions at Martinique or the destruction of Tokyo, and we ask ourselves what are the use of these forces which, whenever we see them at work, are either destroying or threatening to destroy man and his works, and so whose very existence seems to reflect upon the wisdom and the goodness of the Creator of all. Now such impressions, though founded perhaps upon accurate descriptions, are nevertheless absolutely inaccurate, for they lead us to regard volcanic forces as generally evil and disastrous. And such impressions are as incorrect as if, for instance, we were impressed with the idea that the action of the sun was generally disastrous by descriptions we had heard of the sunstrokes, droughts, blisters and thirst of which it had been the cause, or if we regarded water with disfavour because of the floods and cases of drowning which are constantly due to it, or had an aversion to air as a destructive element on account of the storms and hurricanes which it produces. Anyone who heard us speaking of the work of the sun, water and atmosphere in this way would immediately say, 'You are under a great delusion, for you are mistaking the temporary, the accidental, the partial, for the permanent, the normal, the complete. You are regarding a part, and that neither a very great part, nor a very characteristic part as the whole. You are under a similar delusion to that which a man would be under who on reading in the newspaper an account of some dreadful shipping disaster should say, "There! there is an example of the way the ocean works; what opinion can you have of the wisdom and goodness of Him who created it?"'—in the meantime shutting his eyes, good man, to the well nigh incalculable good purposes, climatic, economic, political, and social that the ocean serves to our nation in particular and to mankind at large. Volcanic forces are no exception to this. They too are a great power in the realm of Nature, and certainly, on the whole, a beneficent power.

It is possible that if there were no volcanic forces within the globe, there would be no human life on its surface. Any scientific account of their action indicates that they perform all sorts of useful functions. For instance, they bring up to the crust of the earth many useful and valuable minerals such as gold and silver. In their underground laboratories they manufacture many beautiful gems. They provide us with red and grey granite; they transmute common limestone into marble, and shales into slates: they produce our graphite and pumice: possibly they are agents in the production of our mineral oils: certainly we owe our medicinal hot springs to them and many other products, including new and fertile soils.

On the other hand, we suffer occasionally from earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, and tidal waves as the result of their action, and though we are far from minimising the fearful nature of these catastrophes in some cases, an educated man cannot but notice that they are very little indeed in comparison with the benefits of which volcanic forces are the cause. Not five men, we should say, in a million are killed by earthquakes or volcanic eruptions, and certainly the number killed by them annually bears no proportion to the number who meet their death by drowning or who die as the result of their own folly and wickedness.

This brief summary of facts about volcanic forces illustrates what Bishop Butler wrote some 150 years ago, when in a famous chapter of his on 'the Government of God considered as a scheme or constitution imperfectly comprehended,' he pointed out two things which had to be very carefully considered before any man could reasonably condemn God's wisdom and goodness.

(1) The first is, that no ends are obtained without means, and that God often employs what seem to short-sighted men to be most undesirable means to accomplish what in the long run are seen to be most desirable ends, *e.g.* such dreadful and undesirable means as volcanic forces appear to be to most men, to bring about such on the whole satisfactory and beneficial results as those mentioned.

(2) Secondly, God governs and works by general laws, *viz.* laws which in our case are framed for mankind as a race—

i.e. a related, organised body—and not for particular isolated individuals of that body. It is the greatest good of the greatest number, the advancement and benefit of the whole so far as this is possible, which is the main object of God's government. Seeing before our eyes the result of this system of government and not knowing whether any other system of government is possible under the circumstances, or could produce better results, he must be a bold man who will undertake to prove Nature, and therefore Nature's God, guilty of folly or injustice.

'Fools rush in where angels fear to tread,' but in this case there can be little temptation for any wise and patient man to do so, when every advance in scientific knowledge is such as to increase our reverence for the wisdom of Nature's laws. A closer study in a spirit of humility and patience of the ways of God in Nature will probably lead men to endorse the opinion of St. Paul who, at the conclusion of a deep and comprehensive account of the ways of God in history, penned these words: 'O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God, how unsearchable are his judgements and his ways past finding out.'

But someone may very naturally say, although you may have explained this matter of volcanic action satisfactorily from the point of view of the whole race, how can you explain it satisfactorily from the point of view of those individuals who are overwhelmed by it? We frankly confess that we cannot, and the reason is because the divine government is a scheme or constitution very imperfectly comprehended by us. Here is the sphere for faith, which alone is able to offer some solution of the mysteries of fear, and pain, and death. Our intellect shows us reasons for the existence of each of these, but it is only faith which can make us regard these reasons as satisfactory in *all* cases.

We see that a sense of fear is implanted in us for purposes of self-preservation, as also is that of pain. We see that they develop in men certain moral qualities which would be impossible without them. To fear we owe such virtues as caution, foresight, thrift, energy, and perhaps even courage. To pain we oftentimes owe sympathy, patience, gentleness, spirituality. As for death it is not only that process by which we end a life

which the condition of the body has rendered intolerable, but it affords extraordinary opportunities both for faith and heroism. As to whether the existence of fear, pain, and death in this world are reflections upon the wisdom and goodness of God, no one can prove conclusively. Faith teaches that they exist for the welfare of mankind here, and that those who learn here the lessons that this world has to teach them never meet with fear, pain, and death again, whereas those who do not learn the lessons of this life, are certain to meet with them again in another life. Fear, pain, and death seem to serve a reasonable purpose. In many cases, so far as we can see, they produce a beneficial result, and it seems therefore not unreasonable to believe that they serve a beneficial purpose in those cases where the result cannot be seen by us, or even where seen it does not seem beneficial. Moreover, where so much wisdom and goodness are seen, a knowledge of which grows with our knowledge of the universe, we cannot but think it more reasonable to believe, and to act upon the belief that they extend to every part of creation, than to think them wanting in any part of it, especially in those parts where we cannot prove anything one way or the other. For, after all, what is man from the point of view of knowledge? He is a being who has little more than passed the portal of life, and is moving forward between two infinities, an infinite past and an infinite future. Shall he then say with calm assurance, the Creator of the Universe is mistaken here; He is unjust there? Would it not be better for the character, the happiness, the usefulness of such an one to try

> 'And feel at heart that One above
> In perfect wisdom, perfect love
> Is working for the best'?

Or adopt as his rule of life the poet Cowper's wise and reverent advice:

> 'Judge not the Lord by feeble sense,
> But trust Him for His grace:
> Behind a frowning providence
> He hides a smiling face.
>
> Blind unbelief is sure to err,
> And scan His work in vain,
> God is His own interpreter,
> And He will make it plain.'

THE FOURTH GOSPEL AND THE SYNOPTISTS

By the Rev. A. T. W. Dowding, M.A., Vice-Principal of St. Aidan's College, Birkenhead.

THE obvious differences which a comparison of the Synoptists and the Fourth Gospel reveals may be briefly presented in tabular form as follows :—

Synoptists.	Fourth Gospel.
A. OMISSIONS.	
Miracle of Cana, Raising of Lazarus, Nathanael, Nicodemus, Washing of the disciples' feet, Samaritan woman, Greeks.	Genealogies, Virgin-birth, Temptation, Transfiguration, Gethsemane, Institution of the Lord's Supper, Ascension.
	Titles and terms, *e.g.* Scribes, tax-gatherers, sinners, exorcism, leprosy, with repentance, forgiveness, watchfulness and prayer, hypocrite.
B. DISCREPANCIES IN COMMON DATA.	
(1) Order of Events.	
Ministry of Jesus began in Galilee and ended in the visit to Jerusalem. It covers the space of little more than one year.	Jesus makes His first disciples in Bethany beyond Jordan; thence He goes to Galilee, whence He went twice to Judaea (during two Passover seasons) before He went for the Passover at which He was crucified; this covers a period of two or three years at least.
Cleansing of the Temple at the end of the ministry.	Cleansing of the Temple at a very early period in the ministry.
Jews resolve to kill Jesus after the Cleansing of the Temple.	Jews make this resolution after the raising of Lazarus.
The Supper is the regular Passover meal and so eaten on Thursday evening, Nisan 14 (our reckoning), which was the beginning of Nisan 15 for Jews. It is implied that the Crucifixion took place after the Passover.	Supper eaten 'before' the Passover (13, 1, 18, 28, 19, 14) and crucifixion on the actual Passover day 'between the evenings.'
Simon compelled to bear the cross.	Jesus bears His own cross.

(2) The Teaching of Jesus.

His utterances progress towards a public disclosure concerning His Messiahship, but there is more concealment than disclosure.	From the first His statements proclaim His Messiahship.
Kingdom of God and the scribes' interpretation of the Law form the principal subjects dealt with in parables and concise sayings.	His own Personality and His relation to the Father dealt with in long allegorical discourses like sermons where it is often to distinguish the words of Jesus from those of the writer of the Gospel.

(3) Other Points.

(*a*) John the Baptist = the forerunner; a great personality.	(*a*) John the Baptist is merely a witness to Christ; the subordination of his work.
(*b*) In the Synoptists Jesus refuses to work signs to prove His Messiahship.	(*b*) In the Fourth Gospel the miracles of Jesus are signs purposely worked to prove His Messiahship.

The evidence summarized in the above table forms the starting point of this paper. Westcott in his *Introduction*, p. clvi, makes the following statement which sums up the significance of the facts thus :—

> 'The Synoptists and St. John differ in the general impression which they convey as to the duration, the scene, the form, the substance of the Lord's teaching.'

This is the problem which has existed since the days of Clement of Alexandria. That Doctor of the Faith thus testifies to the early appreciation of the difference between the standpoint of St. John and that of the Synoptists.

> 'Having observed that the bodily things had been exhibited in the other gospels, John, inspired by the Spirit, produced a spiritual gospel.'

Like the Hymn-book then this problem is both ancient and modern. No scholar, conservative or radical, denies the existence of the problem. On the page in his introduction already referred to Westcott writes :

> 'As we compare the pictures more carefully, and in this view they are two and not four, we find that the general difference between the Gospels which is thus obvious reaches throughout their whole composition.'

Critics are then agreed as to the existence of the problem. They set out to try to explain it, not to explain it away.

1. There is the conservative view which has remained practically intact since Westcott marked out its main lines. It takes the form of a series of narrowing circles (not Westcott's invention, but originally the early hostile criticism of St. John assumed this form). Internal evidence assumes this form:

(*a*) The writer of the Fourth Gospel was a Jew. (*b*) He was a Jew of Palestine. (*c*) He was an eye-witness. (*d*) He was an apostle. (*e*) That apostle was St. John.

There is only one conclusion possible if this thesis stands, *i.e.*, that the Fourth Gospel ranks with the Synoptists as history. There is nothing further to do but to seek to harmonise any apparent discrepancies. This indeed is the implied conclusion of the statements on pp. lxxxiv-v of Westcott's *Introduction*:

> 'The real difference is that the earliest Gospel contained the fundamental facts and words which experience afterwards interpreted, while the latest Gospel reviews the facts in the light of their interpretation. *But in both cases the exactness of historical truth is paramount.*'

2. The opposing view that the Fourth Gospel is not historical in the sense that the Synoptists are (especially Mk. & Q.) has recently been expressed in the following words by Dr. Wade in his *N.T. History*.

> 'The Gospel of St. Mark, upon which the other two Synoptic Gospels are based (so far as the incidents recorded are concerned) presents an account of Our Lord's public life in which there is traceable a development of events that, on the whole, commands confidence as historical. With these the Fourth Gospel, if written by the Apostle St. John, would be in general accord. . . . But when the contents of the Fourth Gospel are carefully examined as a whole, the contrast offered by it to the other Gospels is not, in general, that which might be expected to characterise the production of one possessed of first-hand knowledge as compared with narratives resting upon second-hand information' (pp. 214, 218).

There the position stands. Can we profitably spend our time in gilding the lily of traditional conservatism or painting the rose of traditional radicalism? Some words of Bishop Headlam in his last book, *The Life and Teaching of Jesus Christ*, p. 37, should decide the matter. With regard to the Fourth Gospel he says:

> 'There is nothing very convincing to be said about it. The whole critical question is in confusion, and neither those who hold the traditional view nor their opponents are able to put forward a theory which commands assent.'

Here is food for thought. Dr. Headlam's statement means that we have arrived at an *impasse*. Yet there must be a solution somewhere. If one hypothesis has been found wanting, we must seek about to find another. Is there any other alternative than the traditional one? There appears to be a point of departure in some words of Westcott, p. 156:

> 'It is impossible for anyone to turn directly from the first three Gospels to the fourth without feeling that he has been brought in the later record to a new aspect of the Person and work of Christ, to a new phase of Christian thought, to a new era in the history of the Christian Church. In this there is a halo of divine glory always about the Saviour even in scenes of outward humiliation: the truths of the Gospels are presented in their relations to the broadest speculations of men: the society of believers, of "the brethren" (20, 17, 21, 23) stands out with a clear supremacy above the world.'

Westcott himself did not develop this pregnant statement. Probably because his time was not ripe for it. As a practical man as well as a critic he addressed himself to the problem as it was presented in his day. It was a day of more rigid antitheses than is the present. Westcott's task was a justification of the historicity of the Fourth Gospel which was denied on the grounds of its divergence from the more historical triple tradition. So the words quoted above may be regarded as prophetic. New light is thrown upon them by a statement by Dr. Moffatt:

> 'The day is now over when the Fourth Gospel and the Synoptists could be played off against each other in a series of rigid antitheses, as though the one were a matter of fact and homogeneous chronicle and the other a spiritual reading of the earlier tradition. Recent criticism of the Synoptic gospels has brought them nearer to the Fourth Gospel. . . . The Synoptics were written ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν (out of faith unto faith). The motto of Jn. xx, 31, would apply to all the three (but in a special sense to Mark, in spite of the difference of angle from which Mark and John view the Messianic dignity of Jesus, both aim at demonstrating that he was the Son of God)' (*Introduction to the New Testament*, p. 540).

This view was not above the horizon when Westcott faced the problem. The Synoptists are nearer to the Fourth Gospel than was thought then. If there is a surplus of preaching in the Fourth Gospel there is a plus of preaching in the triple tradition. Prof. Moffatt in his *Theology of the Gospels* states that what is explicit in the Fourth Gospel is implicit in the Synoptists. Perhaps there is more of the original leaven in the

first three Gospels. But leaven has a distinct function. It does not exist for itself. Its use is to make bread palatable. There may not be so much of the leaven in its original form in the Fourth Gospel. That only reveals a later stage of development. The leaven permeates the ingredients once external to itself and both are preserved in new forms. So was Christianity in the world and the original historical nucleus which lies behind the Synoptic gospels as well as the Fourth Gospel passes before our eyes into the experience and thought of early Christianity. What Westcott's statement leads to is this. As with the epistles so with the gospels the best way of approaching them is to obtain some idea of their setting. We cannot study the gospel in water-tight compartments. In separating the gospels from the general life of the Church which gave them birth, we are left with cut-flowers and lose the living plants.

In brief outline it is possible to indicate some of the advantages of pursuing this view of the gospels. The main ideas to be kept in mind are: (1) The gospels like the rest of the N.T. sprang from the soil of Christian life, (2) This soil of early Christian experience holds the solution of the problem, (3) We must begin at the right point, *i.e.* with the N.T. epistles, which are regarded as chronologically prior to our gospels. In fine we must place the gospels against the Apostolic Age as a background and there is every hope that, seeing them in the perspective, we shall be able to estimate them aright.

We have to begin with the earlier epistles of St. Paul which were written before there was any gospel in the form familiar to us. From those epistles it is possible to reconstruct a Church in being, with definite beliefs, practices and hopes. The epistles reflect a corporate life and a Christian theology before the gospels rose. Since the gospels sprang from such soil, we shall naturally expect to find them bearing marks of their origin. This point, however, is better dealt with at a later stage. Let us take a step back and try to account for the rise of the gospels.

We begin by trying to visualise the probable situation that would be created by the preaching of some apostle. Those who were converted became conscious of a change in their general attitude towards life. The effect of this change rup-

tured the harmony which hitherto had marked the relation of the convert to his environment. Christianity, however, did not deliver him from his old environment and place him in a new one. He had to go on living as a Christian in the old environment until the end of his days, or until the grand climax of history was brought about by the Lord Jesus. The epistles reveal the number and nature of the difficulties which rose at once to the surface of the lives of these first believers. There were problems affecting citizenship, money, social life, theology, morals, the ancestral faith, childhood, employment, marriage and death.

All these can be resolved into one comprehensive problem, which lies behind the books of the N.T. We can formulate the problem as a general question thus: What should be the attitude of the Christian towards the facts of life between the moment of his conversion and the future Parousia?

We see how St. Paul addressed himself to meet this question in its manifold forms. No inconsiderable part of his epistles is taken up by his attempts to satisfy the needs of his converts. It is true that he had not much to offer in illustration of fundamental Christian moral principles from the words and works of the Lord whom he had not known in the flesh. But it is perfectly plain that he recognized no other form for Christian living except the pattern of the Lord Jesus. In his epistle to the Phillippians he writes with an emphasis, heavily accentuated by an adjacent daring theological speculation, that the essential rule of Christian conduct, always and everywhere, was to make the Lord's mental outlook the ideal of Christian life. 'Let that mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus.'

Now it is a notorious fact that there are few people who readily grasp the significance and practibility of an abstract principle—not even if the principle has received classic expression in a real life, if that life has at no point entered the orbit of the experience under consideration. It does not therefore demand an undue use of the imagination to anticipate the appearance in early Christian experience of a further set of questions which are implicit in the former.

We can suppose that many a Christian in difficult circumstances might say: 'Brother Paul tells me that I should make the Lord's point of view mine. But was the Lord ever actually

faced by my sort of problem? It would be of the utmost service to me to know that this was so, and what He thought, said, and did.' As far as the evidence goes it seems that St. Paul had little to contribute in this respect.

The next step in our attempted reconstruction is the fact that St. Paul was not the only apostle who travelled. The other apostles who travelled pass almost unnoticed, for as Professors K. Lake and Foakes Jackson appositely put it in *The Beginnings of Christianity* (*vol.* 1). 'They were Agamemnons who never found a Homer.' Papias has preserved the suggestive tradition that St. Mark was the companion of Cephas and travelled with him. The tradition is early and worth noting in this connection:

> 'Mark having become the interpreter of Peter wrote down accurately everything that he remembered, without, however, recording in order what was said or done by Christ. For he did neither hear the Lord, nor did he follow him; but afterwards, as I said, attended Peter, *who adapted his instructions to the needs* (of his hearers), but also had no design of giving a connected account of the Lord's discourses. So then Mark made no mistake, while he thus wrote down some things as he remembered them; for he made it his one care not to omit anything that he heard, or to set down any false statement thereon' (Lightfoot, *Apostol. Patres,* p. 529).

This passage indicates what Cephas might do and say during his visits to distant churches. As an eye-witness of the Lord's ministry the natural thing to expect is that the questions of converts would elicit many reminiscences from Cephas. These questions would rise out of their perplexities. The reminiscences of Cephas, provoked by their questions, would shed light upon the special difficulties of the Christians before him. They felt their problems acutely. Before them was an apostle who had been with the Lord. He could tell them what the Lord said and did when facing problems similar to their own. In a very real sense Drs. Lake and Foakes Jackson have raised an important point into prominence when they stated in *Beginnings of Christianity* (vol. 1, p. 268) that Mark's gospel 'is a primary authority for the thought of the Apostolic Age. We have no better authority.' Converts then would get just the sort of illustrations of the Mind of the Master from Cephas, which would help them to understand the principle which St. Paul gave them. Dr. Knowling's book, *The Witness of the*

Epistles (pp. 1 & 2) was written to prove that the Pauline epistles witness to, and 'confirm the statements recorded in the Gospels, the facts of the life of Jesus.' If this contention is inverted, its force is strengthened. For there is much to show that Mark especially witnesses to a state of things in the early Christian Churches, which is adumbrated in the epistles.

Read Mark with this clue and it is possible to make a legitimate reconstruction of the scenes in those foreign churches, which led to the particular reminiscences of Cephas of which the Gospel of St. Mark is composed. These Mark would hear Cephas tell and retell with that uniformity of detail which is compatible with the common needs and natures of Christians everywhere. It is possible to feel the questions of converts underlying many of the passages in our Mark. There is a striking passage (*Jn.* 14, 26) which runs: 'The Holy Spirit shall teach you all things and bring to your *remembrance* all that I said unto you.' Is it impossible that the Spirit spoke through questions of Christians like the following. What was the mind of Christ with regard to the Imperial taxes, family difficulties, social duties, and others to which there are parallels in Mark, which are the more remarkable if what is found in that gospel represents the reminiscences of Cephas?

If St. Luke's preface means anything it can only mean that during the period following the volcanic flow of the new evangel into the wider Graeco-Roman world, the demand soon sprang up among the churches for accounts of the Lord's earthly life which would cast light upon moral and other problems. Many took this task in hand. But clearly Luke felt that these efforts did not adequately meet the needs of the churches. For the demand not only creates the supply, but also exerts a controlling influence upon the form and contents of it. *Jn.* 21, 25, also throws light upon this point.

> '. . . There are also many other things which Jesus did, which if they should be written every one, I suppose that not even the world itself would contain the books that should be written.'

Again, if the main conclusion of the Synoptic Problem is correct, *i.e.*, that Luke and Matthew had Mark before them as one of their principal sources, then Luke's preface is a criticism on Mark as one of the many, and as such Luke did not

regard it as fully adequate to meet the needs of Christians whom he knew. To remedy this defect is exactly what Luke proposed to attempt for Theophilus. Further, though not expressly mentioned in the First Gospel as it is in Luke, yet the fact that Matthew also used Mark supports the same conclusion.

The point reached is that there were two commentaries (*i.e.* Matthew and Luke) upon Mark and Q, before the writer of the Fourth Gospel felt that the times demanded further consideration of the facts. Here we have arrived at the point whence we started, which is implied by Westcott's statements touching the changed environment which accounts for the differences between the standpoints of the Fourth Gospel and the Synoptists. The needs of Christians are still the controlling factor as they had been from the time that Cephas first began to draw upon his memory for the benefit of his hearers. The differences between the gospels mean then, from this point of view, differences in the stages of Christian experience. It is the Fourth Gospel which records the blessing for those who had not seen the Lord and yet believed on Him. The saying might be applied to all the people to whom Cephas spoke, for whom Mark put his notes together, to those also for whom Luke and Matthew used Mark and Q, and further sources; as well as to those for whom the Fourth Gospel was written. Dr. Moffatt reminds us the Gospels were written by Christians for Christians who wanted help in trying to follow Christ through this troublesome world. The needs of Christians who had not seen the Lord is the soil from which all the Gospels sprang. But we have to bear in mind that early Christian life expanded with immense rapidity once it struck root in the Mediterranean civilization. Christian life became more complex. Constant and greater calls would be made on the reservoir of oral and written accounts of the Master's life. The practical needs of the Churches would draw them forth.

To conclude. It is not without significance that Mark begins at the Baptism of Jesus; Luke and Matthew with the genealogies of Jesus, and last of all John's prologue unveils that region, where the Logos was with God. If the original basis of our Mark (which is the *terminus a quo* of all gospels) was what Mark took down of the reminiscences of Cephas, then

we have another section of our attempted reconstruction dovetailed in. For it was after the Baptism that Jesus called Cephas, and there is no evidence of any previous acquaintance in Mark. Hence the reminiscences of Cephas would be naturally bounded by the first public act of the Lord—His baptism (*cf. Acts*).

Just as Cephas had been able to supplement Paul with his valuable stories from the Life, so in time other questions arising would call for further light from that Life other than Cephas had imparted. What did the Lord say about prayer, the law, and all that is contained in Q, particularly the parables, of which Mark is so bare? Controversy with Jews would impinge upon the youth, childhood, and parentage of Christ. This is the extent of the ground covered in the triple tradition. How then are the Johannine differences to be accounted for? Along the same lines. A close examination of the differences should enable us to reconstruct the circumstances antecedent to the gospel statements. We should ask what it was that drew forth 'a new aspect of the Person and work of Christ, a new phase of Christian thought.' It is in that 'new era in the history of the Christian Church' that the key of the knowledge we require lies hidden but not lost. The gospels then are all theological, though in varying degrees. The theological temperature is most normal in Mark, and rises perceptibly in Luke and Matthew, till it reaches its zenith in John. There is a plus of preaching in the Synoptists. There is a surplus of preaching in John. We shall start on the right road if we begin by putting the initial question correctly. We shall not ask: Is this gospel more true or historical than that? We shall ask: What were the antecedent factors which stimulated their production? We have to come to a decision about the whole of that literary deposit of early Christianity which we call the N.T. The gospels are rooted in the wider setting. They are special efforts to answer the question 'What think ye of Christ?'

THE CHURCH IN ITS RELATION TO RELIGION

By Miss M. D. PETRE, author of *The Life of George Tyrrell.*

'Terribilis est locus iste: hic domus Dei
est et porta caeli: et vocabitur aula Dei.'

IF religion dealt with the immediate and material interests of life, and if it were as inevitable to the individual as it is to mankind at large, it might not require any institutional existence, though even then some institutional form might be its natural outcome. But it is not inevitable to the individual consciousness, and hence the need of some concrete presentment of religion by means of which the individual can more fully apprehend the spiritual world of which he is a part.

The Church claims to be the *Primum Mobile* of Divine action, the appointed means by which man is put into relation with God, and enabled to hear the words which God addresses to His creatures.

Religion is sometimes in the same case as mathematics and other sciences, of whose virtue we all partake without any direct acquaintance with them. But whereas in science and art and industry the majority can take their profit from the knowledge of a few, it is of the nature of religion to yield its fullest gifts in proportion to the consciousness with which they are apprehended.

The main object of a Church, as of every form of religious association, is to bring to mankind in general, and still more to every human individual in particular, that religious conviction without which religion is inadequate and inoperative. A Church can only do this in so far as she can establish a claim to some spiritual mandate, in virtue of which she becomes a means of access to the spiritual world. According to pre-Copernican theology that proof has an absolute and demonstrative value which it is hard to maintain in the light of post-Copernican science; for although the theology of the mediaeval Church claimed no direct support from the prevailing cosmo-

logy, the two were closely knitted in the general philosophy of human life. A theology that claimed to enlighten us on all things in the heavens as well as on all things on earth, a Church that claimed to be religious mistress of all creatures that were yet on their probation, were essentially affected by the revolutionary change of outlook.

Yet man is not less keen on his earthly existence since he discovered his subordinate position in the universe; nor is his part in the world of ultimate spiritual values lessened by his knowledge of material immensity. The result, indeed, should be the very opposite, for the remoteness of matter makes manifest the intimacy of spirit.

The Church's mandate is to be sought and found in her power of putting her children in relationship with God. Religion, though humanly universal, remains dim, vague, undefined, and often impotent, until it has assumed a definite form and a concrete organization. The Church offers herself to mankind as a school of eternity; her test is in the experience of those who make trial of her. Some form of religion is inevitable to us all; a Church is, to some extent, a matter of choice; we come to her because we need her, and we stay in her because, by satisfying our spiritual needs, she gives proof of her divine mission. She exists, in a special manner, for the individual rather than the race; for his need of teaching and training; for his need of some assurance in regard to his spiritual destiny; for his need of a spiritual society in which to work out his spiritual career. Thus the Church provides the means, the place, the organization, needed for a religion that is to be conscious, direct, personal or individual, and social.

Aula Dei, rather than *Domus Dei;* the threshold rather than the house; the gate of heaven and not heaven itself, are the symbols by which we would denote the sacred, and yet relative, character of a Church.

We are strangely made beings, for though eternity is our true element, though we know this in so far as we know all that is best in life, music, poetry, art, contemplation, love, yet we know also that we can be in it and not of it; that we need a mode of entrance; that we shrink back from it and turn with relief to the limited and temporary; that there are times when

we would rather play with the smallest toy on earth, a box of pins or a pebble, than go forth from our tiny shell into immensity.

The great thinkers and originators of the world have passed out of this fear in so far as the life of the mind is concerned —by the impulse of genius, or by the force of will, their existence is lifted above the temporary into the eternal—for science and art and philosophy and poetry, at their highest, enter on the domain of religion itself.

But whereas such as these apprehend eternity by force of mind and thought, it is religion that makes of it the place, the home, of the entire being. And for religion to do this we need some high means to the exercise of religion. We need an ante-room of eternity; a school, a gymnasium, an academy, a porch of entrance to that spiritual life which is the paramount need of us all. Of that life we are a part; but only an unconscious, unreceptive element until we lay hold of it by mind and will, by understanding and action, by knowledge and love. We are in search of the infinite, but we can only reach it through limitations, for life on earth is lived by means of restrictions.

In this manner the Church responds to a twofold need: the need of the endless and the infinite, the need of the definite and limited, for not only does she afford us the means to partake of spiritual life, but also a shelter from the overwhelming sense of immensity.

The records of geology, the revelations of astronomy, impress on the mind so crushing a sense of endless numbers, countless years, unmeasured space, as to render it infidel from mere despair. The Church offers a spiritual home on the waters of spiritual immensity; a spiritual purpose in the midst of spiritual chaos; a spiritual importance to the being overpowered by the sense of material littleness.

The Copernican revolution is an incident in the life of most individuals as of all humanity. We feel, as life goes on, the smallness of every human institution even in relation to our own little world. We feel lost, not only in interstellar space, but even in our own planet, even in our own land. We need to establish some relationship with an immensity to which we belong, but which we cannot apprehend unless some form be

given to that relationship. Our soul cries out for a mode of entrance, a method of apprehension, for association in the great quest. In proportion to our sense of overwhelming vastness is our need of something great enough to satisfy us, near enough to comfort us, comprehensible enough not to bewilder us.

A house whose roof was so high that we could not see it, and whose walls were so far apart that we could not reach them, might be sound in structure, but it would be no shelter. To live under a low ceiling is oppressive: to live under too high a ceiling is to live under no ceiling at all. We need a house for the soul as we need one for the body. In the intimacy of religious association, with its boundaries and sign-posts and restrictions, we can best cultivate that intimacy with spiritual immensity for which the soul has innate affinity.

In his great work on Pagan mysteries and Christianity[1] M. Loisy has drawn out the analogy between the former and the latter, and that analogy is, on its main lines, very striking and convincing. The Pagan mysteries, he shows us, though derived in some measure from the national religions of the lands in which they arose, were also distinct from and independent of those religions. Their appeal was supernatural and universal in character, as it was also individual. This analogy seems to me to be equally appropriate and applicable to the relationship between religion in general and Churches in particular. As strictly national religions were the concern of the State rather than the individual, and as the mystery religions responded, on the contrary, to the needs and claims and inspirations of the individual, so the general instincts of religion are inherent in humanity as a whole—perhaps in the animal creation as a whole—while the Church issues her invitation to the individual soul; her appeal is not only to the human race but even more to the individuals of which it is composed.

Thus again, like the mystery religions, she oversteps national and particular boundaries because the individual, *qua* individual, has his own spiritual needs independently of the

[1] *Les Mystères Païens et le Mystère Chrétien.* Alfred Loisy. (Paris: Emil Mourny, 1919).

political society to which he belongs. National religion is particularistic in character, personal religion is universal.

We must not, in this place, make any confusion between national religions and national Churches. The former are, of themselves, instinctive and undefined; the local or racial manifestation of the general religious instinct. They receive political shape and definition from the State, but in this they are civil, rather than religious institutions. A national Church, on the contrary, is a Church with a special position of privilege in the State; it does not forfeit thereby its essential relationship to the individual.

Yet the true character of any Church, as of the mystery religion, is essentially supernational, because the advantages she offers are such as all men can or should desire and all men have an equal right to obtain.

Thus in virtue of her conscious spiritual power the Church not only offers her guidance and help to all men, but even claims that they are bound to accept her offer. The mystery religions were content to admit all those who pleaded for admission, the Church sends forth her order that all men should actually make that plea. In no better way could she verify her mandate than in her claim to be the receptacle for all humanity, even to its basest off-scourings.

She regards herself as inevitable, yet according to the theme of this essay she is not inevitable, but is offered to the individual soul as a matter of choice—as a means and not an end. The individual may belong to her before he is capable of choice, in virtue of the inherited choice of others; his spiritual destiny may be knit with hers as closely as his political life is knit with that of his country; the actual reasons for his choice may never occur to his mind, which is at rest in the place appointed it. But, essentially, the Church is relative to that absolute life which she inculcates; and it is the denial of this contingency and relativity which does more to weaken her true claim than the hostility of the outside world. The Church has to accept her true place in history as in the universe, even though, by so doing, she has to admit rival claims on the part of other manifestations of God in the world.

Thus the Church is, properly, the *chosen* home of the individual soul. Every human being has in him some embryo of spiritual religion; if that embryo remain undeveloped, he will have no conscious religion, and Churches will have no meaning for him. If that embryo be developed, he may still have no inclination for any Church, if his religion remain semi-conscious and inchoate; finding its outlet in intellectual or artistic life rather than in any definitely religious exercise; or even if he be of the rare human specimens that can really develop in solitude. But if that embryo become fully and actively developed, and if the individual be normally social in constitution, he will seek religious fulfilment by way of teaching, training and association, just as he seeks fulfilment in other branches of life.

Thus, only, can we account for a scheme of Divine Government according to which some remain ever outside the Church which offers herself to all. Her membership is privileged in so far as her blessings are bestowed only on those who belong to her; but the great field of religion is not confined within her borders, she supplies religion but does not contain it. Thus only can we account for the high religious character of many for whom a Church has no use and no signification.

What, then, does the Church offer to those who choose her?

First of all, a spiritual home—which means a place to which we belong and which belongs to us; a place in which each one of us has a value and importance of his own, so that the whole body is interested in his welfare, hurt by his misfortunes; a place from which we can go forth to our daily work and to which we can return in the evening for rest and food; a place which can be sadly forgotten and yet not hopelessly lost, abandoned and yet recovered.

Next she offers a way of life; a set of co-ordinating principles by means of which the varied and chaotic interests of life are reduced to unity and system. We know how to live, because we know what to live for, and we know what to live for because the Church offers, as her supreme message, the promise of eternal life. Like the mystery religions, she exists chiefly for this end. She offers to mankind a personal participation in eternal life, and in such personal participation is implied the promise of personal immortality.

MORAL TALES OF THE HINDUS

By Alban G. Widgery, M.A., sometime Professor of Philosophy, The College, Baroda.

IT is a well-known fact that religious teachers in the East have given and still give much of their popular instruction through tales. The parables of Jesus form some of the most impressive and memorable passages of the Gospels and have been of inestimable worth in Christian moral teaching. Though it is possible to elaborate a conception of Christian ethics without them, they add considerably in matters of detail. Similarly, to obtain an adequate and satisfactory picture of the ethics of Hinduism, as distinct from the principles implied by the predominant philosophies, a study of Hindu moral tales is almost indispensable. Nevertheless, even apart from these tales, there is a definite body of evidence that the Hindus have been conscious of the demands of morality as expressed in its highest principles and in practical precepts. But it is not in the literature devoted to the distinctively religious or philosophical that this evidence is to be found. The ethical was treated in what was termed *nītī-sastra* or the science of conduct. Very little literature of this kind is at present known. Perhaps the main and decisive reason for this is that the Indian epics, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyana* have come to play so central, dominating and comprehensive a *rôle* in the diffusion of moral ideas that, in comparison, other literature of the type of *nītī-sastra* has tended to be neglected. The Epics, including as they do expositions of ethical principles and enumerations of virtues and vices, as well as moral tales, have constituted a large part of the stock-in-trade of the travelling teacher and minstrel, far larger and more widely used than the material of the philosophical systems. Most of the tales of the Epics have a fascination of their own and definite moral implications, but a survey of them in relation to Hindu ethics requires independent consideration.

Besides the Epics there are collections of moral tales which constitute not merely valuable material for the study of the

ethics, but are also excellent examples of the oriental story-tellers' art. The varieties of framework into which the stories are fitted manifest ingenuity comparable to that displayed in the ideas binding together the tales of the Arabian Nights or the Canterbury Tales. The Indian collections have generally something of a moral idea even in the framework, and a moral import is found in nearly all the tales. Thus, the *Sinhasāna Dvatrimsati*, or the thirty-two tales of the throne, tells how king Bhoja approached the throne of the famous king Vikrāmaditya in order to sit upon it. But around this throne thirty-two images were carved, and before Bhoja could occupy it, one of these began to speak, saying that no one should sit on it who had not virtues like those of king Vikrāmaditya himself. Bhoja asked what these were. The image then related a tale of that famous monarch, illustrating an instance of his great virtue. The tale finished, Bhoja went away, but the next day he returned, determined to occupy the throne. The second image having spoken in similar fashion and recorded another tale, Bhoja again went away. On the following day he came once more, but the third image caused him to pause in his intention, by reciting still another tale. Thus each image narrated a story illustrating Vikrāmaditya's virtue, and the thirty-second having finished, a spell was thereby broken and the throne was transported to heaven.

The *Suka-saptati* or seventy tales of the Parrot are also strung together by an idea with a moral implication. A few days after her marriage a bride was left by her husband who was called away by business. For a while she bore her loss with comparative equanimity, but becoming lonely and dull she decided to follow the advice of some of her friends and to seek gaiety in clandestine love meetings. But a parrot in the house, wishing to prevent her from such immoral and imprudent conduct, said to her: 'If you will make love, by all means do so, but before you go, hear the tale I have to tell you.' When the tale was finished, it was too late for the woman to go out that night. The next evening she determined to go, in spite of all the parrot might say. 'All right,' said the parrot, 'if you wish to go, go. That is, if you are as clever as Yasodevī was.' Her curiosity aroused, the woman asked: 'And who was she?' In reply the parrot told another story with the same good re-

sult. Thus it happened for sixty-nine nights. On the seventieth day the husband came home, and in the seventieth story the situation is illustrated and the wife brought to see the advantage of her having been saved from adultery. The twenty-five tales of the Goblin and the twelve stories of Madanakāmaraja are also collections which have moral implications in their framework.

The predominant ethical feature of the tales of the throne is that of self-sacrifice. Vikrāmaditya is depicted as at all times ready to give up for the good of others, wealth, some magic gift acquired by some act of merit, even his wife or his own life. In the tales, whenever the king gives up his life, it is again restored to him by some deity pleased with his virtuous conduct. One day the king sat in his palace grounds and a *yogi* or mystic appeared before him, followed immediately after by a warrior and his wife. The warrior declared that there was a war in the heavens in which he wished to take part, and, knowing the king's supreme trustworthiness, he begged permission to leave his wife under the king's protection until his return. To this the king agreed. A short time afterwards, legs and arms and finally a head fell from the sky, and it appeared that they were those of the warrior. The widow insisted on immolating herself on her husband's funeral pyre. But a little later the husband came to the king and asked for his wife. Alas! she could not be restored, and the warrior was told of her self-sacrifice on what was supposed to be his funeral pyre. He was not satisfied with a story which he imagined was a mere pretence in order that the king might keep the wife for himself. The king protested in vain, and at last the warrior asked the king to give to him the queen, his own wife, to prove his good faith and to compensate him for his loss. With some regret, the king nevertheless consented with an instant self-sacrifice, and went to call the queen. On his return only the *yogi* was there: the warrior had vanished. 'All this,' said the *yogi*, 'was simply by the power of my magic, a mere illusion to find out the extent to which your self-sacrifice would go.'

The collection from which this tale is taken contains enumerations of virtues and vices, not exhaustive but suggestive of fundamental motives. Selfishness, sloth, passion for hunting, for watching dances, for gambling, or illicit ass-

ciation with women, is strongly condemned. So also are the spirit of malevolence, hostility founded on jealousy, impatience at the praise of others, putting blame on others, the wish to kill those who offend, robbery especially by fraud, refusing to give what is within one's own power to those who have need of it, wandering about with no purpose. On the other hand, men are urged to seek pleasure in virtue; to observe the precepts of the scriptures; and to perform the duties each of his own caste. All should turn from evil and conform to the law, act justly, and always try to aid others. Obedience should be shown to parents and to the king. Women should associate with one man only. Every opportunity should be taken to show hospitality. Rich persons ought not to be envied, images should not be broken or disrespected, no creature should be oppressed or harmed. Life is precious, but better than to keep it is to give it up for the good of others. The soul remains. The king once came upon a number of *pandits* near a river arguing as to the meaning of the scriptures, and he reprimanded them for being most concerned in reading into them their own opinions. Almost immediately afterwards they all heard someone calling for help, and turning, they saw that a man had fallen into the river. None of the *pandits* disturbed himself in the least, but the king went at once and saved him.

One of the Goblin tales (*Vetālapançavimsati*) tells of a king who had fallen in love with the beautiful wife of one of his generals and was thereby so distracted that he was seriously hindered in the execution of his duties. Finding out the cause of his master's disquietude, the general, with a spirit of self-sacrifice, offered his wife to the king. But to take her or to accept her thus both appeared to the king to be morally wrong, and he replied to the general: 'I am a king. How can I do such a wicked thing? If I should transgress, who would be virtuous? You are devoted to me. Why do you urge me to a sin which is pleasant for the moment but causes great sorrow in the next world? If you abandon your wedded wife I shall not pardon you. How could a man in my position overlook such a transgression? It is better to die.'

Another of the tales concerns a youth who, with his mind full of desires for wealth and power, chanced to meet and to enter into conversation with a *yogi* who came to know that his

mind was intent on these things. Suddenly the youth found himself in enjoyment of the luxury and power he had desired, but shortly afterwards all this changed and once more, poor and discontented, he was at the *yogi's* side. The *yogi* explained that this achievement had been brought about all by his magic powers. The youth eagerly asked how such powers could be obtained, and learning that severe training was necessary, nevertheless determined to enter upon it. Eventually, after years of effort, he performed correctly all the necessary practices, but he did not obtain the magic powers. The story ends with the explanation, of true ethical import: 'Magic powers do not come to a man because he does things that are hard, but because he does things with a pure heart.'

The twelve tales of Madanakāmaraja, all too long to be summarised here, illustrate a variety of situations and events from which moral lessons are to be learnt, and imply definite ethical conceptions. The chief ideas suggested are that the deceiver will in his turn be deceived; that some repayment will always come for assistance that is willingly given; that nothing is impossible for a person who really perseveres; that ungrateful persons will never prosper; that to give food is one of the highest forms of charity; that the chastity of the wife has its effect on the welfare of the husband. Other tales illustrate the baneful influence of anger, illicit passion, and of vindictiveness. True merit and faith are always rewarded.

The *Hitopadeśa*, or book of good counsel, is a collection in which most of the stories are related of non-human creatures, like the Aesop's Fables. The recension we now have of them is interspersed with ethical aphorisms. Some of these aphorisms merely suggest prudence, but the majority have a highly moral character. For the student of Hindu ethics these latter have a more direct use than the tales which they accompany, and in conclusion two or three may be quoted as examples. 'Liberality with kindly words: knowledge without pride: bravery with forbearance: wealth with contempt of possessions: these are four excellences hard to find.' 'Good men show compassion even to beings that are worthless. The moon does not refuse her light to the house of a Chandala (an "untouchable").' 'Righteousness is the only friend which follows men even after death.'

THE EYE OF FAITH

By the Rev. E. W. Lummis, B.D.

'A jest's prosperity lies in the ear
Of him that hears it, never on the tongue
Of him that makes it.'

THIS remark of Rosaline to Berowne has proved its truth only too often in our own experience, when our polished irony has been taken for dull earnest, or our fine point of wit has recoiled, blunted, from a crass brain. Shakespeare himself illustrates it in his best comedy, when he shows us how Olivia's capable and accomplished fool, though he can suit himself admirably to such various beings as his own lady, the Duke Orsino, Sir Andrew Aguecheek, Sir Toby Belch, Viola and Maria, dries up hopelessly when confronted with Malvolio. It is not the fault of poor Feste: how can anyone convey a humorous idea to a mind that is destitute of humour?

This is one aspect of a much wider truth. In order to understand each other any two persons must have some medium of language, even if it be only a language of signs or looks; and they must also have some common ground: some knowledge or taste or interest or passion, or some view of life, or some way of thinking or feeling, which they both share.

To put this in another way: whenever any spiritual being enters into effective communion with any other spiritual being, either to convey knowledge or to awake emotion or to make an impression of any kind, the recipient of that impression must of necessity have a share in some element that belongs to the agent. That share may be slight, fitful, imperfect, but *some* share there must be. When a wise man talks to a child, he does not talk down to the child, from a height above it: he becomes a child himself, enters the child-world, and speaks and listens as a child speaks and listens. Anything that cannot be conveyed under those conditions he had better not try to convey at all, for the child will have no faculty for receiving it.

I have stumbled upon this word 'faculty,' and a little later I shall be using it in a cardinal part of my argument. I am

aware that the word is nowadays avoided by psychologists, but I am not employing it in the sense which they deprecate. By a faculty I do not mean a part of the mind, or any self-existent or separable entity. When I say that a mind or soul or spirit has a faculty for something—say a faculty of sight—I mean simply that the mind, soul or spirit *can*, or could if it tried, *do* something specific—for instance, see.

Saintly John Bunyan accused saintly George Fox of 'horrible blasphemy' for teaching that since the Bible was the work of the Holy Ghost, and was written for our learning, we must, if we are truly to understand it, have some part ourselves in the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. But Fox's doctrine was, in this, Catholic, orthodox and true. It is assumed in the Collect for Whitsun Week, 'Grant us by the same Spirit to have a right judgment in all things.' For here we have the conditions which I have predicated: we have the Divine Spirit entering into effective communion with the human spirit, and this implies that there is something common to the human and the Divine. The faculty in man by which he receives the guidance of the Holy Ghost is called Faith: and it is itself a work of the Holy Ghost, included by St. Paul in the list of products of the Spirit in the Epistle to the Galatians. In this sense, on the fourteenth Sunday after Trinity, we pray Almighty and Everlasting God to give unto us the increase of faith. In this sense, too, those that walk in the Spirit are also spoken of as the household of faith.

Faith, then, in St. Paul's epistles, is regarded as the faculty of striving, not without success, to gain light and power in our spiritual life. It is the specific spiritual faculty, and concerns itself with that part of our earthly life which is not *merely* earthly and transient, but belongs, here and now, to our eternal life. Faith *itself*, therefore, belongs to what is immortal in us, and provides that common ground which is needful if the Holy Spirit is to hold effective communion with mankind. This doctrine comes out very clearly in two passages: that in which the words, 'fight the good fight of faith,' are immediately paraphrased into 'lay hold of the eternal life,' and that in which faith is mentioned first in the three things which are not, like preachings and tongues and γνῶσις, fragmentary (ἐκ μέρους) and

destined to be set aside (καταργηθήσεται), but whole (τὸ τέλειον), and permanent (νυνί δὲ μένει πίστις).

All this, though supremely important, is also extremely familiar. Familiarity does not always breed contempt, but it always tends to blunt the sharp edge of impression. There is a terrible story about the assassination of one of the Medici. The only moment when he could be caught unguarded was the moment when he bent to receive the Body of our Lord, and none of the professional murderers in Florence dared to commit the sacrilege of killing him then. But, we are told, a certain priest, who was accustomed to celebrate mass in that church, and was therefore less overawed by the sanctity of the sacrament, undertook to stab the prince as he made his communion. It is a piece of history that every priest should know, and remember with awe.

The best way to overcome the staling effect of a too close acquaintance with anything—a mountain, a house, a doctrine—is to approach it from a new side, so that it offers a fresh aspect. I propose, therefore, to illustrate the Pauline doctrine of faith by certain considerations which were not at the disposal of a missionary in the first century.

The great idea which arose and won its way to recognition in the nineteenth century was a new conception of God's creative work, expressed in the word 'Evolution.' One of the more fascinating routes along which evolution can be traced—though the best books on the subject are written in German, and are hard to come by—is the development of individual organs; and since each organ (as the word 'organ' implies) is defined by its function, we are, upon this track, always in presence of two things, two interdependent but disparate things, which are maturing together, namely, an organ and a faculty: for instance, the lungs, and respiration; the hand, and the power of grasping; the ear, and the faculty of perceiving and diagnosing sounds.

The organ that I intend to use for the purpose of illustration is the eye, and the faculty is sight. There are in animate nature quite a number of differently constructed eyes: some of them simple dots of pigment, some composite, with as many facets as a cut diamond, some in cups, some on stalks, some in

groups of ten, some in pairs, some single, and all adapted to the particular kind of life the creature has to live. But *we* are concerned with the human eye. You know what a complex structure it is now. It began, ages ago, in one of our humble ancestors, by appearing as a mere speck of pigment in the skin. Slowly, very slowly, as the millennia rolled away, it took its form and received its accessories. It did not develop in a straight line. It retains vestiges of contrivances that once were useful, but are now superseded. Little by little it became a paired organ in a bony socket, with a rampart of nose-bone, with pigmented corner and iris in front, with a globe full of liquid behind, with retina and optic nerve, and machinery that expands or contracts the iris to regulate the admission of light, with muscles that raise and lower it or move it from side to side, with protective lids and lashes and a penthouse of eyebrow, with an instinctive reflex that snaps it shut when harm threatens it, with all manner of minute adjustments to the needs which it serves.

And alongside this physical development another process has been going on, of quite a different kind, a psychical development. Its story is not to be told, like that of the organ, in terms of bio-chemistry and histology, but in terms of psychology. It is true that it begins with something very 'low,' as we say, in the psychic scale. It begins with something sensory, some unconscious reflex, not very unlike the response of a sensitive plant to contact. It is true that the main stretch of its development belongs to what we call instinct, an automatic, unconscious or subconscious actuation. But it ends—so far as we can yet follow it—in the highest region of mind that we know: it ends in the complex impressions and intricate judgments which come to pass when two human eyes watch an opponent's move on a chess-board, or the lines of a letter that trembles in the hand, or the faces of a jury seen from the dock, or of an audience seen from the platform, or Alpenglühn in the Bernese Oberland, or an enemy movement in a general engagement, or a sleeping child, or printed words in the *Strand Magazine* or the *Hibbert Journal*. And since the evolution of the organ is repeated, stage by stage, in the human embryo[1]—

[1] Some of the earliest steps are obscured by what is known as cenogenesis, but not more than in other mammals.

though that is always distinctively the embryo of a man, never of an amphioxus, for instance, or of a saurian or lemur or ape —we may be sure that our ancestors have gone through the corresponding psychic development also. The mind of a very distant progenitor responded automatically to a dull sensory stimulus, that could not be called sight at all; ages later in the series we find a creature that can distinguish various degrees of light and darkness in one expanse; millennia pass, and this power is refined into true photographic vision—such as some zoologists assign to our friend the dog—interpreting the world in light and shade; at some stage the power of distinguishing colour came in, and grew gradually more delicate and discriminate. The psychic development, indeed, has outstripped the physical. We no longer wait for natural processes to shape for us, at the expense of a few myriads of years, an eye that will give us a picture of Neptune's rings or the nebula in Orion, an eye that can detect thousands of organisms swarming on a grain of dust, an eye that can see through things which to our normal vision are opaque. We make for ourselves the sort of eye we require, call it a microscope, an X-ray apparatus or an observatory, and we either carry it about with us, or go up to it, or walk inside it, as our convenience dictates. And a number of us make a new use of the convenient rampart of nose-bone, by teaching it to support an extra pair of lenses, to supplement the pair we were born with.

I have chosen the eye and vision as my typical organ and faculty for two reasons: one is, the close connexion between eye-sight and the common-sense; the other is the Pauline contrast between faith and sight (*διὰ πίστεως γὰρ περιπατοῦμεν, οὐ διὰ εἴδους*).

Eyesight has no doubt done more than any other faculty (though the functions of the human hand have given it important help) in bringing about that complex assumption which we call the common sense: the assumption of a world in which tables and chairs, trees and animals and the bodies of men and women are real things, with real qualities, such as hardness or softness, heat or cold, fragrance or stench, brightness, dullness, all sorts of colours, sounds of all *timbres* and degrees, bitterness, sweetness and distinctive flavours, roughness, and a

multitude besides, for many of which no names are to be found. This is the world of the *naïf* realist, which we all, for ordinary secular purposes, take for granted; the world on which the natural science of the nineteenth century was based; a world in which Plato and all his followers, ancient and medieval, Spinoza, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, Fichte, with almost every great metaphysician, profoundly disbelieve.

However much we doubt its reality, we cannot escape from it. We cannot deny its validity for the purposes of our earthly life. It is a world of three dimensions in space, of continuous time, of universal flux (*πάντα ῥεῖ*), of cause and effect, of an unalterable past and a more or less malleable future. How far these categories have taken our senses in charge, and forced them to interpret phenomena accordingly, how far our senses have evoked the categories, to bring some sort of cosmos into their chaos of impressions, is a question around which philosophy vaguely gropes. But it is at least certain that as new senses are evolved, or new powers bestowed by human devices upon senses already developed, the new percepts are always adjusted to the old categories. It may be true, also, that in this process the categories themselves are modified: but such modification is very slow and very slight, and confined to very few minds, in comparison with the huge mass of new facts that is always being conformed to our standard ways of conceiving.

Taking, then, the common sense for granted, we can easily, by its means, rationalize and justify such a sense as vision. It is a great advantage to a fox to be able to see, from a height, exactly where and in what direction the hounds are running. It is a great advantage to a huntsman to be able to give a view halloo. Any creature endowed with reflective thought would realize at once that exact information at long range, through the searching eye, was an immense improvement upon less exact, short-range information, through the more passive nose or ear. And although we do not credit the lower animals with much reflective power, we do recognize that their subconsciousness, their so-called 'instinct,' somehow reaches the same end as reflexion. They behave as if they fully appreciated the advantage of being able to see. And so they use their eyes continually, and gradually develop special powers of sight.

adapted to their needs. Unreflectively, if not reflectively, they value sight, and therefore use it, and therefore develop it.

And now let me recall the actual history of the mammalian eye. It began as a tiny spot of pigment in the skin, which could only convey a very weak, very vague actuation, worlds away from what we call seeing. That into which it has now been moulded can see, and has for ages been able to see. There has been a change from something that was not seeing, to that which is seeing, and the organ has changed from something that was not a sight-organ into something that is a sight-organ. We need not rack our brains to determine exactly at what point this change took place. It is enough for us to realize that, wherever we fix that point, there were long ages in the evolution of the eye before it was reached. Now we know that every organ which is not used withers away. We know therefore that the rudimentary eye, which did not wither away, but increased in power, must have been used for long ages *before* it could justify itself by obtaining any clear and exact information. It must, during that time, have been trusted, or it would not have been used. It was, in a quite literal sense, *blindly* trusted, and that blind trust led in the end to the faculty of vision.

I admit, of course, that the nascent faculty, which was not yet vision, must have been of some advantage to the creature. Those that trusted it survived, while those that neglected it perished. But the animal with the rudimentary eye was not acquainted with the laws of natural selection. It did not trust in order to survive. It survived because it trusted. That trust was the energetic thing which worked out the evolution of the eye. And it is a great fact, widespread as is animate nature. Bergson calls it the '*élan vital*.' The writer of the *Priestly Code* says, very pertinently, 'darkness was on the face of the deep; and the Spirit of God moved.' May we not recognize this blind trust as a kind of infant faith, the work of the 'Giver of life, who proceedeth from the Father and the Son'?

In what way does man, considered as animal, differ from the rest of the animals? In two ways, which are interinvolved. The first is that his line of evolution is psychic rather than physical. He does not, like the rest of the primates, grow longer arms, or a prehensile tail, or a more deadly jaw, or

mightier muscles. He develops his *mental* faculties, until what at one time was hardly more than a superior cunning has already become wisdom, scientific acumen, artistic power, virtue, courtesy, civilization, religion. The second is that he is a social animal in a new sense: he is not (except sometimes in warfare) a mere unit in a pack; he is not, like an ant or bee, subordinated and sacrificed to the welfare of the community. His society is so many-sided and intricate, and has so many cross divisions, that the very multiformity of his relations to it makes the individual man a greater and more subtly accomplished being. He has his common-sense, with all the faculties that have been accommodated to it, and digested into it. Has he nothing more?

The very fact that his development is psychic, liberated from the age-long labour of moulding old organs into new forms or dimensions, and of developing new material parts, will of itself ensure that his evolution is much more *swift* and *free*. His own psychic achievements and devices (language, universal intercourse, education, libraries, laboratories, works of various art) are at once an insurance against regress, and an increasing acceleration of his progress. But progress—whither? What is his end, his object, his goal, his purpose? If we know at all, if we dare prophesy at all, ἐκ μέρους γινώσκομεν καὶ ἐκ μέρους προφητεύομεν. The mere posing of the question takes us into the sphere of religion. 'What is the chief end of man? To glorify God and to enjoy Him for ever.' This is language, not of science, but of faith.

A host of different considerations tend to show that mankind is still evolving. If creation has a purpose in which this planet has a part, where can we seek for it except in man, and how can man dream that it is fully attained? By all analogy mankind, like every other organic being, is undergoing change, and that his mode of change is mainly psychic makes an expectation of swift development—of development, indeed, dynamically, acceleratingly swift—all the more probable.

But that development will not consist merely, nor chiefly, in the cultivation of those faculties of which man is already the conscious and proud possessor, the faculties of the daylight consciousness, the logical, scientific, inventive, constructive

faculties: for all these are conditioned by the common-sense, and adapted to it. Even when (philosophizing) they themselves rebel against the common-sense, and question its validity, they are still only common-sense faculties, and present a *reductio ad absurdum*, a kingdom divided against itself. Our evolution will surely proceed according to the process which we have seen in animate nature, that is to say by the emergence of *new* faculties, which rise out of the mysterious depths of our nature into the daylight of our conscious reason. And these faculties will not need, in a psychic creature, the creation of new bodily organs, or even, so far as we know, the provision of any organs at all. The most materialistic philosopher would not demand more for them than a microscopic modification of certain tissues in the brain.

If then we *have* nascent, incipient faculties, what can we assume or infer about them? On the analogy of animal evolution we may be sure that they will serve needs which, whether we know it or not, are of the most instant concern to our destiny. Those are not our physical needs: no creature on earth has achieved so perfect a machinery for supplying physical needs, even in overplus. If any man ever starves, it is either by some strange misadventure, or through the heartlessness of his fellow-men. Nor are they the needs of our intercourse, on the level of the common-sense, with one another. The faculties that we possess are triumphantly reducing the spaces on earth's surface to a speaking-distance, conquering the air and the sea-depths, making mankind a closely united, if not yet a quite harmonious, family. May I roughly define the greatest concern of man *quâ* man—not a mere mammal, but something set apart from other mammals—in these words: we need to know what, in truth, we really see, what purpose we serve in the scheme of things, and how that nature and that purpose should affect our common effort, and our relation to one another. These things are not to be divined by the common-sense faculties, the logical or scientific faculties, the daylight faculties, of which vision is a type. They demand faculties that can have communion with the unseen.

(There may, no doubt, be also some purely physical faculties that are nascent in us, and may be made subservient to the

higher demand: such, for instance, as the magnetic sense which Lord Kelvin recognized as rudimentary in many human beings, and better developed in some few. But these lie outside my topic.)

Faculties that have communion with the unseen we do, in truth, possess. We cannot fully rationalize them, we cannot base them on, or derive them from, the common-sense, or any common-sense faculty. We cannot fully realize them, any more than we can banish them from our being. They are sometimes no more than 'a presence that disturbs [us] with the joy of elevated thoughts,' and sometimes a sense sublime

> 'Of something far more deeply interfused . . .
> A motion and a spirit, that impels
> All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
> And rolls through all things.'

They are, in sum, what we mean by 'faith'—and something more.

For we usually apply the term 'faith' to such a faculty only when it is applied to such objects as are currently called 'religious.' But the distinction between religious and secular concerns is not made by faith itself: it is made by the ordinary common-sense reason. I cannot concede that there is any region of human life where religion is an intruder. It seems to me that we may call all those persistent, extra-rational, refining impulses, whether they are mystic, ethical or (in the loftiest sense) aesthetic, by the inclusive name of Faith. By faith we accept the Bread from Heaven, the Word made flesh; by faith also we realize the holiness of the starry sky, the mountain range, the green forest, and it is faith that whispers to us in a strange and noble language when we stand beneath the arches of a sublime cathedral, or witness a deed of unselfish daring.

'Faith,' says the writer to the Hebrews, 'is the substantiation of our hopes, the logic of the unseen.'

BOOK REVIEWS

AN ENGLISH SOCRATES.*

At the tender age of three, John Stuart Mill began the study of Greek, and his father took good care not to discourage the child's faculties of inquiry: 'Anything which could be found out by thinking,' says the *Autobiography*, 'I never was told until I had exhausted my efforts to find it out for myself.' Hence it is not surprising that Mill grew up the kind of man who, as Carlyle said, 'were he to get up to heaven, would hardly be content till he had made out how it all worked.' Such a type is not necessarily pleasing to his contemporaries, though he may be serviceable to them. We shall recollect that Socrates expected to spend his time in the other world in testing and inquiring as he did on earth, and shall remember his end. Yet Mill found a congenial atmosphere in nineteenth-century England, which was an age of 'sensible men.' Even Gladstone, who was not always sensible, and entertained most of the prejudices of a clergyman, used to call him the Saint of Rationalism; and after observing that he had 'the good sense and practical tact of politics, together with the high independent thought of a recluse,' sorrowfully confessed that such men are rare.

It is common knowledge that Mill became more or less of a renegade to the faith in which he had been so piously reared, and read Wordsworth and Carlyle instead of Jeremy Bentham. 'Ah, poor fellow,' said the dyspeptic Thomas, 'he has had to get himself out of Benthamism; and all the emotions and sufferings he has endured have helped him to thoughts that never entered Bentham's head.'

Yet Mill never surrendered to Romanticism, and his *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy* is a declaration of independence, and a rejection of that idealist philosophy in which Romanticism had clothed itself, and which had captured the vigorous imagination of Carlyle. Mill was neither German nor Scot, but remained obdurately English, *i.e. empirical.* What Kant called 'the fertile bathos of experience' was Mill's standing-ground throughout.

Furthermore, Mill, impatient of speculative philosophy, was unversed in some of those inner motives of religion which Pascal understood so well. He did not quite realize the depth and poignancy of the religious problem, even though he understood it a good deal better than James Mill did. His attitude throughout is Greek rather than Hebrew; his utterances are those of Prometheus, a rebellious and defiant rationalist, rather than of an abashed and awestruck Job. It may be asked which is the more profound attitude: the one type will have a plain answer or die for it, the other knows that there exists no explanation that he can understand. Mill, at any rate, will be put off with no pious substitutes for an explanation; and he attacks, not with Voltaire's inimitable wit, but with English solemnity and solidity, the optimistic naturalism of Rousseau, with which romanticist thinkers were too generously tinged. The essay on Nature works havoc with all pastoral idealisms of the 'gentle savage' order. Nature may attract by her beauty and craftmanship, but her dealings bear the stamp of terrorism and injustice. From her we can derive no conclusive evidence for an absolutely good Creator. The only possible way in which the modern man's belief in a God Whom he can worship,

* *Three Essays on Religion*, by John Stuart Mill. Reprinted from the Third Ed. Longmans. 5s. net.

can be reconciled with his experience of the actual world, is by assuming that the Deity is good, but not all-powerful.

In the second essay, *The Utility of Religion,* Mill discusses the advantages of religion to mankind. He does not hold that morality benefits by being based on supernatural sanctions (which is the usual argument for religion from an utilitarian point of view), but he attaches value to religion for other reasons. Religion (like poetry) supplies the need for 'ideal conceptions grander and more beautiful than we see realized in the prose of human life.' Religion, as distinguished from poetry, 'is the product of the craving to know whether these imaginative conceptions have realities answering to them in some other world than ours.' Mill seized on the truth that the religious problem is the problem of the relation of value to reality, nor have we got much further than that since his day. Thus the truth of religion can never be proved, for if it were obvious that reality and value coincided, the religious need would not be felt, and the religious problem, with religion itself, would evaporate. Thus Mill's religion, like that of Kant, and perhaps also like that of the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, was a hope or a faith rather than a set of metaphysical dogmata.

Mill's attitude towards Christianity is revealed in the following passage in the last of the three Essays:

> 'The most valuable part of the effect on the character which Christianity has produced by holding up in a Divine Person a standard of excellence and a model for imitation, is available even to the absolute unbeliever, and can never more be lost to humanity. For it is Christ, rather than God, whom Christianity has held up to believers as the pattern of perfection for humanity . . . And whatever else may be taken away from us by rational criticism, Christ is still left; a unique figure, not more unlike all his precursors than all his followers. It is of no use to say that Christ as exhibited in the Gospels is not historical, and that we know not how much of what is admirable has been superadded by the tradition of his followers. The tradition of followers suffices to insert any number of marvels, and may have inserted all the miracles which he is reputed to have wrought. But who among his disciples or among their proselytes was capable of inventing the sayings ascribed to Jesus or of imagining the life and character revealed in the Gospels? . . .
>
> 'About the life and sayings of Jesus there is a stamp of personal originality combined with profundity of insight, which if we abandon the idle expectation of finding scientific precision where something very different was aimed at, must place the Prophet of Nazareth even in the estimation of those who have no belief in his inspiration in the very first rank of the men of sublime genius of which our species can boast. When this pre-eminent genius is combined with the qualities of probably the greatest moral reformer, and martyr to that mission, who ever existed upon earth, religion cannot be said to have made a bad choice in pitching on this man as the ideal representative and guide of humanity; nor, even now, would it be easy even for an unbeliever, to find a better translation of the rule of virtue from the abstract into the concrete, than to endeavour so to live that Christ would approve our life.
>
> 'When to this we add that, to the conception of the rational sceptic, it remains a possibility that Christ actually was what he supposed himself to be—not God, for he never made the smallest pretension to

that character and would probably have thought such a pretension as blasphemous as it seemed to the men who condemned him—but a man charged with a special, express, and unique commission from God to lead mankind to truth and virtue; we may well conclude that the influences of religion on the character which will remain after rational criticism has done its most against the evidences of religion, are well worth preserving, and that what they lack in direct strength as compared with those of a firmer belief is more than compensated by the greater truth and rectitude of the morality they sanction.'

We fear that these admissions on the part of our philosopher will hardly satisfy the demands of theological dogmatism and ecclesiastical devotion. Considerations of this sort may have recommended themselves to the Saint of Rationalism, but the faith of the faithful requires firmer foundations; nothing less than supernatural portent and intervention will satisfy them that Christ was He that should come; and if these be not forthcoming, they will straightway look for another—probably somewhere in the sphere of Materialism. J.C.H.

CHRIST AND MODERNISM.*

This little book is a criticism of Modernist Christology as deduced from the Report of the *Girton Conference* of 1921. At the outset, Dr. Sparrow Simpson makes it clear that he does not regard Modernism as a body of doctrine, intended by a definite body of Churchmen to be substituted for traditional dogma. 'It is,' he says, 'an attempt to harmonise traditional doctrine with theories of the century. It is a tendency rather than a formulated result,' and this fact is kept before us throughout the book. Of Modernism so understood, Dr. Sparrow Simpson recognises both the value and the necessity, and indeed it can fairly be said that he criticises Modernists as one of themselves. For he writes approvingly of the *Kenosis* or the doctrine of self-limitation of Deity in the Person of Christ, while frankly admitting that 'it is, of course, a re-statement of the faith.' Nor does he write as an authoritarian, but holds that Churchmen have 'sometimes opposed as false what they ought to have approved.' Our author, recognising that doctrine must often be formulated in terminology which is not able to discharge its explanatory functions equally satisfactorily in every age, allows that we may distinguish between the '*substance*' and the '*form*' of a dogma. We are glad to note this acceptance of the important distinction between *fact* and *mode* in doctrine, for the recognition of which Modernists have pleaded for a long time.

None the less, there can be no doubt that Dr. Sparrow Simpson finds little to approve in such attempts to restate Christological dogma as have so far appeared. Approaching his subject on lines now familiar to traditional apologetic, his first chapter is headed 'Modernist Presuppositions,' and we notice that the extracts which form the basis of his criticisms in this chapter are all taken from only one of the papers read at Cambridge. We readily admit the fairness of his criticism, when, following Bishop Gore, Dr. Sparrow Simpson points out that one can be hypnotised as easily by Modernist as by Traditional presuppositions. He sharply criticises—and we confess to a measure of agreement with him—the statement that practically nothing can be known of God apart from Jesus, though he is careful to point out that this is but the opinion of an indi-

* *Modernism and the Person of Christ* (Handbooks of Catholic Faith and Practice), by W. J. Sparrow Simpson, D.D. Robert Scott. Price 3s. 6d.

vidual. But Dr. Sparrow Simpson merely wishes to draw attention to those presuppositions which are a common danger to us all, and he does not allow them to play any part in his arguments.

Dr. Sparrow Simpson devotes a chapter to 'Jesus as the Son of God.' In his opinion, the question of the Christ as the Son of David (Mk. xii, 35 ff) constitutes 'no problem at all unless David called the Messiah his Lord in a sense suggestive of Divine prerogatives.' The great saying, 'All things are delivered unto me of my Father,' &c. (Matt. xi, 27: Lk. x, 21 f.) is held to imply far more than Messiahship could mean, namely, 'essential Sonship on a level of equality with the Father.' A great deal is made of the fact that Jesus never betrays any signs of wonder at His being chosen for this amazing relationship, an attitude which is so unlike that of the saint towards God. His language, Dr. Sparrow Simpson concludes, implies a transcendent consciousness.

The Apostolic Christology is examined very much on the lines of Bishop Gore in *Belief in Christ*. In our author's opinion there is nothing to show that, despite the undoubtedly Adoptionist Christology of his speeches in Acts, St. Peter did not share St. Paul's belief in Christ's pre-existence, and it is pointed out that St. Paul's Christology as it appears in Acts is Adoptionist. The two types of Christology can be stated in a form in which, to the modern mind, they are mutually exclusive; but this does not prove that the early Jerusalem Church, with its undeveloped thought, so regarded them. Like Dr. Gore, Dr. Sparrow Simpson stresses the fact that the early Church passed from one into the other unconsciously. Modernism, according to our author, contends that we can return to the Adoptionist idea. 'We are invited to hold that the Person of Christ was nothing more than human.' 'The Modernist conception dispenses entirely with the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation.' Statements such as these are fairly frequent in this book, and they are very arbitrary. We cannot help noting the fact that throughout the whole book we have been unable to discover a single reference to Dr. Rashdall's paper read at the Conference, or to his subsequent defence of the position then taken up. Dr. Sparrow Simpson in this respect seems to have overlooked a fact of which he is generally quite aware, *viz.*, that the various Conference papers were composed in independent isolation by their writers and were intended to emphasize different aspects of the Christological problem; if some papers tend towards Adoptionism, others, notably Dean Rashdall's, clearly teach a Logos Christology. If, as Dr. Sparrow Simpson believes, these two Christologies were not inconsistent in the Apostolic Age, why should he select one aspect of the Cambridge papers, emphasize it as Modernism, and condemn it as inadequate?

Dr. Sparrow Simpson is quite clear and very modern in the matter of Christological development. He emphasizes the fact that Jesus deliberately left Himself to the interpretation of His followers. Neither is there any difference between our author and Modernists in the ascription to Jesus of supreme moral and spiritual authority, and of Deity. The difference between Dr. Sparrow Simpson and the Modernists lies in their respective views of the way in which, and of the kind of arguments by which, this belief is reached. The Modernist sees and recognises a tendency to read back into the earthly life of Jesus the glory which was felt only after His exaltation. And this is not a mere supposition, resting on no evidence. Dr. Sparrow Simpson says nothing about the clear cases of heightening the miraculous, and the development of the idea of our Lord's Person and claims, all of which can be seen by a comparative study of the Synoptic Gospels. In the light of these, it is at any rate not unreasonable

to ask whether this process may not be anterior to the earliest Gospel. And further, when we remember the disparity in date between our earliest MSS. of the Gospels and the original documents, it is extremely precarious to build our theories on one or two isolated texts. This method of exegesis undoubtedly carried weight in the days of verbal inspiration, but it does so no longer. Thus, we are not convinced by our author's exposition of St. Matt. xi, 27 ('All things are delivered unto Me of My Father,' &c.) as proving our Lord's consciousness of His Deity. It is to us a proof of His consciousness of His Messianic mission and office. Nor is it of much use to urge in support of a claim that Jesus was anxious that people should think rightly about His Person, a saying from the Fourth Gospel and a statement that John the Baptist was careful to remove misunderstanding about himself, and that therefore Jesus could not have been less so.

Personally, we are inclined to endorse all that Dr. Sparrow Simpson says about Adoptionism, and to admit that it is no restatement of a doctrine of Incarnation. But we accept the full meaning of a doctrine of Incarnation and therefore *during his earthly life* we do not look for the manifestation of the Godhead of Christ in more than a perfect human consciousness. Granted that His consciousness transcends all that we know as ordinarily human, we remember the impossibility of dogmatizing on the possible content of a consciousness free from a sense of sin. If, as we hold, human nature is to some extent a reproduction of the Divine nature on a lower plane, the difficulty of the Two Natures almost vanishes, and in Jesus of Nazareth we see Deity in so far as perfect humanity can express it, *i.e.*, Deity *sub specie humanitatis*. This, for us, is confirmed by another set of facts of a different order. The life of Jesus did not end with His death: His followers were convinced that He was alive, and that with a power so great as to lead them, in spite of their rigid monotheism, to associate Him with God, and this has proved true for Christian experience ever since. In this set of facts we see the Divine, in so far as we can apprehend it, freed from the limitations of human life, and so we become convinced that this Christ of experience *is* the Jesus of history.

We are bound to say Dr. Sparrow Simpson's book would have been more useful than it is had he devoted a larger part of it to the examination of the critical exegesis, in particular of the Gospels, and of the New Testament generally. As he truly says, many Modernists do not claim that their theories are free from grave difficulties; they do claim, however, that these are certainly not less than those connected with traditional theories, and, above all, that their theories are in closer correspondence with the facts, as disclosed by literary and historical criticism. Still, we welcome criticism of this kind and tone, but feel that, for modern scholars, the matter cannot rest where Dr. Sparrow Simpson leaves it.

J. S. B.

FIDES ACADEMICA.

Of confessions of faith undoubtedly the most interesting are those of men of genius such as Sir Thomas Browne's *Religio Medici,* Thomas Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus,* Ernest Renan's *Souvenirs*; the most valuable for the student of religion are the personal confessions of the twice-born, such as St. Augustine's *Confessions,* John Bunyan's *Grace Abounding,* Leo Tolstoy's *Autobiography*; the most educative probably for ordinary persons are the confessions of faith of men of wide culture and reverent mind who, impelled neither by the *afflatus* of genius nor by the

transports of conversion have tried to express their mature reflections on the meaning of life and the nature of the universe. In this last class we are disposed to place Prof. Percy Gardner's latest book, *The Practical Basis of Christian Belief*.* This volume forms the ninth in a series, and may be said to constitute its appropriate conclusion. Its scope is expressed in the following sentence from the Preface. Its author writes:

> 'The coming of old age warns me that it is time for me to set down in final form the conception of Christian belief to which I have been led by the studies and experience of many years.'

For this reason it is not an easy book to summarize, because it is itself a summary; neither is it easy to criticize adequately, for it consists of conclusions, the reasons for which are only to be discovered by a careful perusal of the preceding volumes.

Prof. Gardner is not primarily a metaphysician, but a historian and aesthete, but he does not in this volume treat the Christian religion from the historical side. He treats it from the side of psychology and religious experience—and the religious experience is not primarily that of others, but his own. He has tried to live the Christian life, and he has learnt thereby what the Christian religion can do for a human personality, for he is a convinced Christian. He writes of his belief:

> 'I am no pantheist, but a theist . . . and, indeed, as I venture to believe, a Christian whose beliefs are closer to those of the Founder of Christianity and his immediate followers than those which are commonly current in the Churches' (p. 41).

Man is investigated almost in the Augustinian fashion. He is viewed as 'a centre of spiritual energy, becoming aware of the nature of his surroundings, of his own nature, and of the divine nature, by the resistances which he everywhere meets to his efforts: resistances by which he is informed and his personality is developed.' But whilst Prof. Gardner is Augustinian in his method, he is modern in his outlook. He is convinced that there are four tendencies of modern thought which must lead to great modifications in the basis and expression of Christian belief. These are: (1) The spread of the doctrine of relativity; (2) the progress of religious psychology; (3) the comparative study of religions; (4) the advance of historic criticism and its effect upon our views of early Christian history. A number of traditional Christians feel that these things are the enemies of the Christian faith, and that to accept their conclusions would be fatal to Christianity. Prof. Gardner holds the contrary. He is of opinion that the Christian faith can be reconstructed in the light of them on a new and more trustworthy basis, and this he attempts to do. He writes:

> 'Such attempts at reconstruction are as far as possible removed from merely rationalist and destructive criticism. Modern psychology has fully justified many of the instincts and feelings which rationalism regarded as superstitious. Modern historic criticism, while diminishing the supernatural and abnormal element in early Christianity, has in fact tended to bring out its pure lustre. A great part, if not the whole, of Christian doctrine turns out to be based upon fundamental facts in the nature of man and the spiritual world. That is the conviction with which I have always written, and the conviction becomes stronger as I grow old' (p. xi).

It is impossible in a work of this scope to fix on more than a few points of interest. Liberal Churchmen, because their theology lacks the

* Published by Williams & Norgate. 12s. 6d. net.

rigid dogmatism of the Traditionalist, are often accused of moral and religious laxity. We doubt if any accusation could be more unjust. Dr. Gardner writes, and all Modernists will agree with him:

> 'The ordinary Christian teaching about God needs infinite stiffening. Such stiffening comes mainly from two sources, the study of scientific law in the universe, and experience of the working of God in the human world . . . What our age greatly needs, as a supplement and corrective of the divine kindness and compassion, is a doctrine of the divine righteousness, emphasis laid on the working of God as one Who hates all sin, all falseness, all cowardice, and all stupidity, Who punishes those who pursue unworthy purposes and lower the moral tone of those with whom they come into contact . . . Sin arises and grows, and for a while men rejoice in it, and find its fruits sweet. But as it spreads and develops it shows that self-contradictory and anti-social character which is inherent in all sin, and poisons the blood of the countries or the classes whom it holds in its grip. In the long run the righteousness of God vindicates itself with terrific force, and men are swept away like birds in a hurricane.'

Dr. Gardner affirms that 'the conception of God which dominates the great majority of people is still at the pre-scientific and arbitrary stage. They think that if there be a God He must needs interfere in the orderly course of affairs in the interests of morality . . . And when great calamities or catastrophes happen, and the heavens remain silent, they dethrone God in their hearts. They say, in the current phrase, that they have no use for such a Deity. A far more serious question is whether God has any use for them. Instead of trying to find out what the ways of God really are, they make up their minds what they ought to be, and when experience explodes their facile optimism they abandon religion altogether' (p. 139).

What perhaps impresses us more than anything else about this book is the writer's conviction of the reality of the spiritual world and that it is the source of man's moral and spiritual energy and growth. 'Man is not an independent and self-contained unit, but is in contact with, and dependent upon an unlimited flow of power and energy, by the aid of which it can perform many deeds quite beyond the reach of its natural powers: and if it be cut off from or abandoned by that power, it dries up and fails like a pool left on the seashore by the retreating sea' (p. 35).

We may not deal further here with this book. It is a volume which is full of impressive and suggestive reflection. It is also plain and quite untechnical in style. It will appeal especially to two classes of readers: Christians who are students, and students who are not Christians, and it seems to us more calculated than any book which we have read of late to transmute the second class into the first. H.D.A.M.

AN UNPROFESSIONAL MINISTRY.*

Mr. Roland Allen boldly challenges our accepted methods of recruiting for the priesthood. In the threatenings of scarcity at home, and in the actual scarcity abroad, he hears a call to reconsider the practice which has hitherto provided an adequate supply of ordinands. It is, he contends, a method which is not in accordance with the directions laid down in the New Testament.

The Apostles appointed 'elders' in every church: we appoint juniors, and select them by an examination of knowledge and character which con-

* *Voluntary Clergy*, by Roland Allen. S.P.C.K., 1923. 2s. 6d. net.

tains no test of powers for future leadership. They chose men of standing and repute: we refuse them ordination unless they are willing to make their vocation their 'profession' or means of livelihood.

The result is extremely unhappy in at least three directions. In the first place the conception of vocation is seriously restricted by insisting that it must be made a means of earning a living. Our author roundly trounces 'the dangerous division of life into religious and secular compartments' which the prevailing conditions involve. 'A minister of Christ is one whom God has called to bear in his person the character of a man called of God to minister always under all circumstances. Voluntary clergy ought to make men familiar with the truth that religion belongs to the whole of life' (p. 55).

Secondly, there arises a tendency to discount the ministry of the paid clergy, because they *are* paid. Mr. Allen holds that those who are estranged from institutional religion believe that missioners who attempt to bring them back do so with a view to strengthening the institution which supports them. 'The result is that the missioners never get a chance of speaking to these people' who do not believe that the ministers can be disinterested. It may be difficult to say how far this allegation is seriously levelled at us, or whether, if all were unpaid, those who make it would respond to the message more readily. Voluntary clergy would, of course, be unhampered by this suspicion.

Thirdly, there is the ever-increasing shortage of clergy whether for the mission-field, the colonies, or home service. In regard to the mission-field, this is proverbial. The Canadian Church Year Book for 1922 gives an indication of the colonial shortage: 'The diocese of Rupertsland has many parishes without a priest; in Qu' Appelle there are twenty-five, in Edmonton nine, in Calgary sixteen, in the Eastern Archdiocese of Algoma fifteen.' The same danger is threatening at home. Mr. Allen quotes a statement of Canon Petit[1] that 'we have now some four thousand men available for work in parochial curacies, as against seven thousand in the previous period.'

In these circumstances, we must be driven to modify existing custom, or to formulate alternative methods. Mr. Allen's solution is to go back to apostolic precedent and encourage the ordination of men of maturer years who feel they are called to the ministry. Why should they be debarred until they are prepared to forsake their normal means of earning a livelihood? This book puts before us very forcibly a scheme for widening and filling up the ranks of the clergy at home and abroad, which merits the most serious consideration both of the rank and file, and those who have to face the responsibility of finding shepherds for the ever-increasing flock.

W. D. Bainbridge-Bell.

A NEW BOOK ON ST. PAUL.*

Prof. Peabody gives two reasons in justification for the addition of another volume to the enormous literature on St. Paul: (1) the new light which modern research has thrown upon the world in which St. Paul lived and particularly on the religious aspect of it, and (2) the modern lack of response to dogmatic and institutional Christianity, of which St. Paul is regarded as the representative if not the originator, side by side with a desire for faith, and loyalty to Jesus; which means, in effect, that the

[1] In a letter to the *Guardian*, Jan. 5, 1923.

* *The Apostle Paul and the Modern World*, by F. G. Peabody. New York: The Macmillan Co. 10s. 6d. net.

theological controversy of 'Jesus or Paul' is still with us as a moral problem.

The contention of this book is that St. Paul was neither the originator of historical Christianity nor the corrupter of the simple teaching of Jesus —a phrase which is beginning to savour of convention. Prof. Peabody realizes that there never has been a community of simple believers striving only to live as Jesus lived. From the first, the significance of His life was more important than the manner of it, and as a matter of fact, the accounts which we have of Jesus emanated from a community in no sense hostile to the teaching of St. Paul. The greatness of St. Paul is that he translated his faith in Jesus into terms charged with meaning for the larger world with which he was familiar. The inevitable result was that his teaching contains Hebrew, Greek, and Latin elements which were purely local and temporary. An uncritical acceptance of the whole of St. Paul's teaching, and not infrequently an over-emphasis on the most transient aspects of it, has resulted in various and often contradictory dogmatic systems, strangely alien from a Gospel of life and motion. 'The soul of a teaching may be sacrificed to the care of its body,' and in point of fact 'instead of translating Paul's teaching into the language of a new time, the needs of the new time have been translated into the language of St. Paul.' Hence much that is popularly regarded as Paulinism, whether of the Calvinistic or sacramental type, is as great a perversion of the Apostle's real mind as his teaching is held to be of the Spirit of Jesus.

None the less, Prof. Peabody recognizes that to pass from the Synoptic Gospels to the Epistles is to enter another atmosphere, though as the passage is frequently made *via* the Fourth Gospel and Acts, the change is often not fully appreciated. Accordingly our author proceeds to a comparison of Jesus and Paul, taking the fullest account of the differences, particularly those of a temperamental nature, and the problem of St. Paul thus presented is 'on the one hand . . . a transition from the simplicity of the Gospels to the complexity of another world of thought and experience; but on the other hand there is a not less tenacious grasp of the spirit of the Gospels which lifts the finest utterances of St. Paul to the level of those of Jesus Himself.' Theories which regard St. Paul as fundamentally changing the nature of Christianity are rejected as evading both history and the problem. Instead, Prof. Peabody believes with Matthew Arnold, that the real Paul, disengaged from misconceptions, will have in the future a greater influence than ever. We are bidden to separate between the timeless elements in Paul's teaching, and the by-products of his thought which had their origin in the conditions of his own age. The solution lies in discrimination rather than in mere elimination.

One of the most pleasing features of this book is an exposition of the Pauline Letters, set forth in an admirably simple manner, as refreshing to the theologian as it is valuable for the plain man. As we go along, the leading Pauline ideas and purposes are distinguished from their Rabbinical and Hellenistic setting, until in dealing with *Colossians* and *Ephesians*, Prof. Peabody sums up by saying that 'these glowing Epistles become a fitting climax to what has preceded them. As it was the purpose of Paul's earlier letters to liberalize the Christian faith, and of the second group to spiritualize it, and of the more formal Epistle to the Romans to systematize it, so in the meditations and revelations of Paul's last phase he is absorbed in the idealizing of history, the lifting of its prose into poetry, the setting of its facts within a cosmic plan.'

From the Epistles, we pass to chapters on the Theology, Religion, and Ethics of St. Paul in relation to the modern world. The leading Pauline ideas are set out in a clear and masterly way. In depicting Paul as a mystic, Prof. Peabody repeats the warning very necessary in these days when the popularity of mysticism, largely due to superficial acquaintance, is in danger of discrediting it. If mysticism 'promotes indifference to serious thought or to human service, then it becomes a refuge for dreamers and a retreat from duty. If it clarifies one's thinking and fortifies one's conduct, then its place in the religious life is assured.' St. Paul is regarded as the classical example of the transmission of mysticism to thought and service; and it is pointed out that no word is more characteristic or reiterated in Pauline writings than Power.

In respect of individual doctrines, Prof. Peabody's method is to show how St. Paul's leading ideas were often expressed in confusion, and in a manner inconsistent with his exposition on other occasions. For example, of the famous chapter on the Resurrection in I Cor. xv, our author remarks, 'nothing could seem more unlikely than that such teaching should be accepted among the conditions and presuppositions of modern life. Its biology, psychology, and prophecy are all alike archaic, Pharisaic, visionary.' Yet in II Cor., when the Apostle returns to the problem of immortality, his picture takes a completely different form, being no longer wrought out of Hebrew tradition: 'I sigh within this tent of mine . . . yearning to be under the cover of my heavenly habitation.' In the opinion of our author, such language is completely acceptable to a modern mind, which, while it no longer listens for the last trumpet call, realizes as poignantly as ever that the moving tent of its body is pitched, each night, nearer home.

These are days when we look for general principles, and there is some danger lest we forget that their enunciation is not equivalent to their application to the specific problems of our own age. It is a danger from which, in our opinion, Prof. Peabody has not altogether escaped. Despite the essentially practical nature of his book, we feel that, occasionially, he has lapsed into phrase-making. Thus we are told that Paul's theology was essentially a Christology, which yet did not reach the point at which the Church arrived subsequently. He finds that 'the deity of Christ is not a Pauline doctrine'; 'on the one hand his Christ is less than God; on the other this supernatural Christ has forfeited His nature as man'—in other words, Paul's doctrine of Christ was Arian. At the moment, we cannot discuss this estimate; we note the author admits that such ideas are not only remote and unreal, but difficult to understand. Yet he adds, 'the desires which it expresses and the needs which it satisfies are as powerful and persuasive as ever.' Now we can fully agree that 'the survival of a teaching is quite as likely to depend on its psychological sufficiency as on its historical accuracy.' Doubtless, too, Prof. Peabody is correct in saying failure to recognize this has been a weakness of 'the so-called Liberal school.' But we do not believe an Arian Christ would appeal to the modern world because the existence of such a being is inconceivable; nor can a doctrine which is fundamentally irrational be psychologically satisfying to rational beings. Doubtless all doctrines satisfy some need or other, and unless they are submitted to the judgment of the reason, one surrenders the only criterion we possess for discriminating between them. Certainly, as our author says, 'what appears to the historian mere mythology may be permanently justified by its interpretation of human nature and experience'; but then it ceases to be 'mere mythology' and becomes rational philosophy or theology.

The reader of this book who expects a close examination of specific Pauline doctrines in the light of modern difficulties about them, will be to some extent disappointed. That does not appear to have been our author's purpose. He has examined the leading Pauline ideas, and shown their basic correspondence with the teaching and mind of Jesus. He believes the later Church is responsible for much of the criticism directed against the Apostle; for example, he has no difficulty in showing that such legal terms as Justification, Sanctification, Propitiation, which St. Paul used only to *reject* the idea of Law, have been used to transform Paul's thought into a kind of legal procedure or ceremonial sacrifice. Similarly, underlying St. Paul's sacramentalism, the essence of his doctrine is in strict conformity with the mind of Jesus, but, in respect of both Baptism and the Eucharist, the Church has most prized the Pauline aspects which were to him secondary, and in their origin extra-Christian or pagan.

Those who are well acquainted with modern theological literature will find little or nothing new in Prof. Peabody's book, though they will find brought together in a popular form information with which they may be familiar only in scattered volumes. Those to whom ordinary theological literature is dull and depressing will find the main results of modern learning set forth in this book with delightful lucidity and clarity. We warmly recommend it. J.S.B.

QUAKERISM IN TWO CENTURIES.

The publishers describe Dr. Rufus Jones's two volumes as 'the completion of a great work,' and few will desire to quarrel with the description. With the appearance of *The Later Periods of Quakerism* in 1921 the task of writing a standard history of the Quaker movement has attained worthy completion. The present volumes are the last of a series of seven of which five deal directly with Quaker chronicles both in England and America, and two with the development of mystical religion before the coming of George Fox and the rise of historical Quakerism. *The Beginnings* and *Second Period* of Quakerism were contributed by the late Dr. Braithwaite, and the five remaining volumes are from the pen of Dr. Rufus Jones. The series taken as a whole provides a field of study of exceptional value to the student of religion in general, and not least to the Modernist, who finds himself in natural sympathy with Quaker seekers after truth, and watches with an understanding eye the struggle of the spirit of freedom against the entangling theories of an over elaborate and wrongly based theological orthodoxy.

The year 1725 may be said to mark the end of primitive Quakerism, and in consequence these volumes which deal with the later history of the movement are concerned with happenings which lack, it may be, something of the absorbing interest attaching to the stirring events of the first days. In the eighteenth century there is a subtle change of atmosphere and emphasis. The great Quaker personalities of the pioneer years have left the stage. The outlook is narrower, less adventurous, increasingly sectarian. There is no lack of zeal, no famine of goodness, no scarcity of noble lives; yet admittedly the world-appropriating faith of early Quakerism has narrowed down into a spirit of world renunciation, and in consequence Friends are seen to withdraw more and more from the doings and interests of ordinary life, fearing the taint of worldliness, and shutting

* *The Later Periods of Quakerism*, by Rufus M. Jones. Two volumes. Pp. xxvi + 1020. Macmillan & Co (1921), 30s. net.

themselves off from the manifold activities of politics, art, and literature, to their own grievous loss.

Quaker 'Testimonies' and distinctive Quaker customs tended to increase further this isolation of Friends from the world about them. The Testimonies against the payment of tithes, against war, against oaths, and against what was known as hat-honour, or the uncovering of the head in presence of a superior, together with peculiar habits alike of speech and dress, served inevitably to separate the Quaker from the ordinary man and woman of the day. Thus the movement which took its rise in a healthy protest against formalism and unreality of whatever kind, whether in speech, life or religion, ran for a time at any rate no small risk of erecting its protests into a formalism of negation no less sterile for being in the first instance a reaction against formality.

In the early years of the eighteenth century the religious temper known as Quietism, which at its height 'marked the most acute and intense stage of European mysticism,' took firm hold of the little society, and for many years stamped the members indelibly with its characteristic spirit and outlook. In Quakerism itself there had been from the first something of quietistic temper. The Quaker theologian, Robert Barclay, in his interpretation of the meaning and significance of the 'Inward Light' (the most characteristic doctrine of George Fox) had used language implying the total depravity of man apart from the action upon him of the divine influence, and the consequent inability of the individual to do or plan anything pleasing to God unless under the direction of the Holy Spirit, conceived of as an external force given or withheld at will. Clearly the doctrine of Quietism need not spell human lethargy or inaction. It may lead rather to a very fervour of activity, to the reckless outpouring of the self in utter obedience to a God-directed impulse. We see the itinerant Ministers of Quakerism exercising for a period of more than a hundred years their informal and prophetic leadership over the whole society, and undertaking in every part of the world tasks of extraordinary difficulty in humble submission to the dictates of the divine voice. While however Ministers relied entirely upon a God-given guidance, and could only go where they were 'sent,' yet it speaks well for the essential sanity of the community that no monopoly of inspired direction was claimed by these itinerant evangelists, but that 'concerns,' or inner promptings, had in all cases to be verified by the Meeting to the members of which the Minister revealed his divinely imposed mission.

Both the Methodist Revival and the Evangelical Movement which followed it brought a direct influence to bear upon the Society of Friends. The period 1775 to 1825 is marked in the opinion of Dr. Jones by three leading tendencies. (1) A clearly defined tendency to mould and formulate Quaker thought in the direction of evangelical doctrine. (2) In reaction from this an over-emphasis upon the doctrine of the Inward Light, and (3) a tendency, much more limited, towards a rationalistic temper and outlook. The influence of Evangelicalism must be held responsible for a formulation of theological doctrine, and an insistence upon the letter of Scripture wholly foreign to the genius of primitive Quakerism. Discussions as to whether or not the Hebrew wars of extermination had been divinely enjoined were heated and unyielding. Those who think the Modernist of to-day a dangerous person for deprecating the public reading of certain passages of the Old Testament, or for desiring to eliminate the imprecatory psalms from the worship of the Christian Church, will do well to remember that the controversy is at least 150 years old. Indeed, as Dr. Jones well says, 'with growing knowledge nothing could

have saved our reverence and appreciation for the Bible if it had not been for the intellectual relief which came with the new insight of historical criticism.' Even as it was English Quakerism suffered sorely in a controversy between orthodox and progressives, and in America the Society of Friends was rent literally in two in the year 1827 by a similar dispute. The movement which had been 'born as a mighty protest of soul against the habit of turning religion into the adoption of theological doctrines,' came perilously near to wrecking itself upon this selfsame rock.

It is a relief to turn from the sorry record of theological janglings to the truly magnificent achievements of Quakerism (achievements never more magnificent than at the present day) in the spheres of social reform, missionary activity, and the amelioration of human wrongs. The end of the eighteenth century showed a marked revival of social activity. Friends both in England and America took up the cause of the slaves with contagious enthusiasm. Their efforts after the civil war to care for and educate the multitudes of coloured freedmen were as wholehearted as they were successful. A barbarous criminal code, the condition of prisoners, of the insane, of the unshepherded masses—all these abuses and many more called forth the untiring services of a host of Quaker reformers, whose names, whether deservedly famous like those of Elizabeth Fry, John Bright, William Allen, Joseph Sturge, or comparatively unknown save to the student of Quaker annals, present an undying challenge to the pessimist and the apostle of the *status quo*.

Two of the most fascinating chapters in a work full of the fascination which becomes apparent only when a writer is in love with his subject, and writes from a sense of inner compulsion at once irresistible and joyous, are those which contain studies of John Bright and John Greenleaf Whittier, men in whom the common level of Quaker group-life is transcended, in whose activities Quakerism is exhibited for what it essentially is, a dynamic power rooted in a mystical closeness of intimacy with the living God, flowering in the beauty of a common life raised to uncommon levels of worth and richness, and bringing forth its fruits in manifold efforts after a better and more Christlike world. Of John Bright our author asserts that 'no other Friend has succeeded to the extent he did in carrying Quaker ideals into practice as the sound and stable basis of national policy.' It is a great tribute, and with it we may couple Dr. Jones's judgment of Whittier, 'to whom the pursuit of truth, the conquest of faith, the endless yearning for clearer sight of the realities by which we live is a diviner thing than accepting outright ready-made formulas of religion could ever be.'

The essential correspondence of the Quaker spirit with the truth of things is abundantly verified by the great Quaker revival of the nineteenth century. Neither a world-renouncing temper nor the shackles of a rigid and artificial theological scheme could permanently stultify the daring spirit manifest in the founders of Quakerism, nor prevent its re-emergence in a new age and under altered conditions. A fresh missionary enthusiasm made itself apparent in the early years of the century, the systematic study of the Bible from the angle of modern scholarship became increasingly common. Friends began to take their rightful place alongside men of goodwill, to whatever denomination they might belong, in corporate efforts for social betterment and educational advance. The Adult School movement, of Quaker origin, has had an incalculable influence for good both upon Friends themselves and upon the multitudes of men who have found in Adult School meetings and courses of study new centres of fellowship, of social enthusiasm, and of religious faith.

The closing years of the nineteenth century may be thought of as the birth period of Quaker Modernism. Under the leadership of John Wilhelm Rowntree the Society of Friends definitely moved out into more spacious regions of thought and life. The modern standpoint, whether religious, scientific, or sociological, was no longer distrusted. Suspicion of learning and scholarship disappeared. The shackles of the past were shaken off. Theological differences appeared in their true perspective, and corporate endeavours after social and political righteousness, valiant attempts to succour the afflicted and to raise the level of human life, tended to bring together, under the healing influence of common action, the separated groups. To-day we see Friends in the van of progress, taking an honourable place in redemptive work on a world scale, work rendered sadly necessary by the horrors of the recent war, and far nearer in temper and spirit to the sanctified initiative and courageous daring of George Fox and the first 'Publishers of Truth' than to the estimable but somewhat narrow piety of two hundred years ago. W. M. PRYKE.

CONDITIONAL IMMORTALITY.*

This book may be described as an attempt to show that the facts of biological evolution supply a basis for a belief in human immortality. Great importance is rightly attached to the development of *individuality*. Increased individuality is, indeed, the criterion by which higher species may be distinguished from lower, and a man contains within himself more uniqueness or individuality than any of his evolutionary predecessors.

But man stands not only as the limit or consummation of certain evolutionary processes; he also stands at a point where altogether new processes seem to begin, whose final results are not yet visible. Man has reached his characteristic position by his possession and use of a consciousness 'looking before and after'; but during those more recent *millennia* of his existence upon this planet (which are called those of recorded history) we see 'survival as due to mental capacity slowly being replaced by survival due to moral character.' Under this new evolutionary principle there comes into existence a new type of life which as far transcends the life of mere cunning as the latter had transcended that of mere physical force—virtually a new reality or quality of existence—emerges, which transcends the merely mental as the mental had transcended the merely organic, and the organic the physico-chemical.

Dr. Simpson is led by such considerations as these to embrace the view of a conditional immortality, *i.e.* that immortality is the 'reward,' or natural accompaniment, of a certain quality of life. Immortality is, in fact, 'a function of goodness' (p. 298), and the attainment of it is 'directly related with a manner of life resulting from a changed outlook and inward experience.' The selfish being, in his chosen isolation, fails to develop higher potentialities, and may live and die on a level of life which has its natural end in physical death. On the other hand, a life may be so unified and integrated by love as to be indestructible.

Dr. Simpson devotes a chapter (*The Scriptural Doctrine of Immortality*) to a discussion of the point whether this view can be reconciled with the utterances of Christ and the apostles. His remarks here are

* *Man and the Attainment of Immortality*, by James Y. Simpson, M.A., D.Sc. Pp. xii and 342. Hodder & Stoughton, 1922. Price 7s. 6d. net.

illuminating, and we recommend the subject to New Testament scholars as very well worth taking up and dealing with systematically. Some recent theological publications which might have been expected to deal with it have avoided this issue. For an unprejudiced discussion of the matter we have to go from the official theologians to a philosopher of a more detached outlook—Professor Pringle Pattison has some interesting remarks in his lectures on Immortality (pp. 195 f.).

> 'It does not follow that we are to think of personal immortality as an inherent possession of every human soul. We talk very loosely of "souls" and "persons," as if these were static entities, magically called into being, and complete from the outset. But it is manifestly a question of degree: *how much* personality, how much of a coherent soul has the experience of life developed within the animal creature? For personality or selfhood is not anything that can be conferred by another, it is emphatically something that must be won before there can be any question of its conservation. What is given is simply the opportunity. A true self comes into being as the result of continuous effort, and the same effort is needed to hold it together and ensure its maintenance; for the danger of disintegration is always present . . .
>
> 'Plato speaks of souls that pass through life in a kind of stupor: "Dreaming and drowsing this present life through." How should such earth-bound souls
>
> *Support the fervours of the heavenly morn?*'

We venture to think that Anglican theologians should take note of the existence of this *tertium quid,* as it might be called, between the alternatives annihilation or universal survival: at any rate, they might do well to express a considered opinion upon it, for it seems to have an attraction for certain minds, and indeed may be said to have an inherent reasonableness about it. At the least it might perhaps be sanctioned as a possible point of view, and not condemned out of hand, merely on the ground that it is unfamiliar, or has not been held in orthodox Christian circles.

J.C.H.

CORRESPONDENCE

PRAYER BOOK REVISION.

To the Editor of the MODERN CHURCHMAN.

SIR,

May I make two observations in regard to the postscript of Mr. Tweedale's letter in the last issue of the *Modern Churchman*, which read: '*Since* writing the above, the Editor of the Grey Book, to whom I have submitted these amendments, informs me that it is proposed to use many of them.'

(1) The Grey Book Burial Office (in Part II) was published a month before the date of Mr. Tweedale's letter. Your readers can judge how far the editors of that book agree with his interpretation of New Testament doctrine, and how far they do not agree with his acceptance of what 'psychic experiences and researches have shown.'

(2) The Grey Book was edited not by an individual, but by a group. One of the group of course was deputed to act as secretary and to see the book through the press. He was not, however, *primus inter pares* as the

title Editor would suggest, but simply the one who at the time had the most leisure. I could not have committed the group to the approval of any suggestions, and in this case I did not, for it was not to me that these amendments were submitted.

'GREY BOOK.'

September 1st.

THE LATE REV. C. W. EMMET.

SIR,

It was my privilege to hear the Rev. Cyril Emmet in his first and only sermon at St. Bartholomew's Church, in this city, on Sunday, the 15th inst. His theme was, 'The significance of Christ to-day.' Little did anyone think that this was his last sermon on earth, and now we mourn his loss. That sermon is never to be forgotten. Full of a great spiritual power and personality, his words will live, for he being dead yet speaketh.

The truth that 'it takes a soul to touch a soul' is fully amplified in the life just laid down, of this wonderfully gifted preacher. His death has touched me more than any other in my experience. Unknown to me, yet known, he gave me food for my soul in his wonderful message of a deep abiding faith in Jesus. Is it any wonder that the press next morning said, 'The vast congregation which filled St. Bartholomew's Church yesterday morning in the hope of hearing Dr. Emmet say something against the Scriptures was sadly disappointed.'

On the contrary there was strong faith expressed in the living Christ which carried conviction that the preacher was a man of God. But he has gone from us. His gain is our loss, and the Church can ill spare such a man from her ministry. Faith in Jesus and in His power to give men the vision of a new life, characterized his utterances, and in the fulness of that power he has entered into the joy of his Lord.

R. MAXWELL BRADNER,
Lieut., Liverpool Scottish.

27 EAST 64TH STREET,
NEW YORK CITY.
July 24th, 1923.

DIVORCE: A RADICAL REFORM.

SIR,

The pronouncement on divorce published in the *Modern Churchman* for June over the signatures of the President, Chairman, Secretary and three members of Council of the Churchmen's Union, must evoke admiration. Its summary of New Testament teaching is singularly well-balanced and concise; its combination of candour and restraint is faultless; and the writers define the true starting-point remarkably well. All Christians must agree that 'no amendment of our marriage laws thought to be inconsistent with the teaching of Christ can be acceptable.' All scholars may unite in regarding the words of our Lord reported in St. Mark as being fundamental and quite unqualified, while nevertheless asking, 'Was he making a statute or presenting an ideal?' and giving the answer, 'His utterances . . . state principles of action, but never laws.' And many Churchmen will share the conviction 'that a real reform is not only desirable, but possible, and that the Church ought to show the way.' Nearly everyone also will be ready to affirm that marriage is far too important an institution, and far too fundamental in human society, to allow

of trifling with the law which regulates it. Whatever change is made or refused, this ought to be founded on some plain principle of general application, not proposed to meet the wishes or the needs of a certain number of persons standing off the line of normal human experience. The argument based on hard cases is vitiated because it begins and ends with instances that are not normal. The counter-argument resting on Canon Law is insecure because the experience of mediaeval Christendom therein reflected is only an episode in the great stream of human life. Marriage is broad-based, and any modification of the law which regulates it will have more results than can be foreseen. Not only timidity and conservatism, but the highest wisdom also, demand that there shall be no tinkering with the marriage law—no 'healing of the hurt of the people lightly, saying Peace, peace, where there is no peace'—but that any change made shall be on some plain principle which goes the whole way; reform must be radical. Can such a principle be set forth? Few face the question, but it may be answered affirmatively.

Christ did not make marriage. He emphatically endorsed the Hebrew belief that God made marriage from the beginning of human life. So he recognized true marriage as he found it, and as it had been found in a long series of past generations, and in many varied races and communities which altogether made up God's human family on earth. He unhesitatingly recognized this varied and imperfect institution, though it showed no conformity to any one regulating law or custom. Even in Israel polygamy had been both lawful and not infrequent within historical times. The greatest figures in the past had practised it—*e.g.* Abraham and David—and though this had since fallen into disuetude, it was still not actually disallowed by the Mosaic Law. The Lord Jesus on the one hand acknowledged marriage on this lower plane as resting on a Divine ordinance embodied in human life, and on the other hand pointed to the fulfilment of marriage in accordance with the Divine purpose, as consisting in the religious union of life-long monogamy. Thus while He lifted the ideal of marriage once for all, and admitted no limitation in that, he also acknowledged that marriage which falls short of that ideal may have Divine sanction. Thenceforward Christian marriage must conform to the highest standard which Christ set forth uncompromisingly; but marriage on a lower level may still find a place in human life which is lawful and right in the sight of God, where the highest standard is beyond attainment. Of the full Christian ideal which He set forth He said, 'All men cannot receive this saying, but they to whom it is given' (Mt. xix, 11).

Here is a wonderful combination of Divine insight and supreme common-sense. The checkered facts of experience are faced without flinching, and the complexity of human conditions and human needs allowed for to the full. But the very heart of God's purpose, and the line of 'the straight and narrow way that leadeth unto life' for man, are shown without faltering or compromise.

Here too we have the plain principle on which the marriage law may be radically reformed. Marriage is a state of human life wider than Christian marriage, as human life is itself wider than Christian life, which is nevertheless its highest realization. And the civil law of a great community which is very imperfectly Christian may well require less than what religious fulfilment demands. Only this ought to be frankly and fully acknowledged by the law itself in that case. The 'Church' has no right to impose on everyone, including numbers who are without Christian purpose, a law enforcing what Christ presented as an ideal: but certainly the 'State' has no right to tamper with the Christian standard, or to

dictate to those who accept it some lower rule. There need be no difficulty in recognizing marriage on both a higher and a lower plane at the same time. The full Christian standard and requirement ought to be maintained in churches, and there endorsed by the law of the land as it has long been in England: whatever increased latitude is needed, ought to be restricted to civil marriage, and never permitted in a church. When the civil courts allow divorce, it should be made quite clear that what they purport to do is to dissolve from the obligations entered into in civil marriage, and from these only, without touching or pronouncing any opinion on the Christian obligations which are beyond them. And any re-marriage of persons divorced should be restricted by law to civil marriage, and be unlawful in a church.

In this way greater latitude might be given where it is really required, and yet the full Christian standard and ideal of marriage would be maintained unimpaired, not only by the Church, but also under the law of what is (at least in some sort) a Christian country.

It would follow that all Christian persons must recognize marriage on the lower plane as a state of life based not merely on civil law, but also on the law of God, which is primaeval and of general obligation for man; even as Christ did. And this would extend to cases of re-marriage which complied with the requirements of the civil law. Such unions would not be immoral: they would be non-Christian. They would not debar the persons re-married from Christian intercourse with others, any more than other persons are debarred who neither reach nor seriously aim at attaining the full height of the Christian ideal of life in other directions. Nor would these be excluded by the fact of their re-marriage from Christian communion; for they would be really married, though on the lower plane; they would in no sense be 'open and notorious evil livers.' Approach to Christian communion must be left mainly to individual conscience, except where there is patent and flagrant wrong-doing. St. Paul recognized this, as the Church has ever since; and we both ought to, and must inevitably do so in the conditions of modern life.

This principle that human life and Christian life are of one piece, both drawing their source from God, but that human life is wider while in Christian life it reaches its true fulfilment, seems to be 'the mind of Christ,' and is implicit in all His teaching. He always put forward the very highest aims and standards, and then either expressly or impliedly added, as he did in the case of marriage, 'He that is able to receive it, let him receive it' (Mt. xix, 12). This sanctions marriage on a higher and on a lower plane, for His disciples and for others. So a way is opened to a really radical reform of the English law of marriage which would afford all the needed relaxation in imperfect lives, but would still uphold the full ideal of life-long religious union between man and woman which Christ refused to qualify. That has done more than can be told to uplift human practice, and to ennoble both men and women; and it will yet do more than can be foreseen. Christians who are loyal to their Lord are bound to stand by it, and maintain it; but if they would 'be perfect as their heavenly Father is perfect,' they must try to share His compassion and tolerance. May we not face revision of the marriage law with the confession in our hearts, 'O Sovereign Lord, thou Lover of men's lives, thine incorruptible Spirit is in all things. Wherefore thou convictest by little and little them that fall from the right way' (Wisd. xi, 26; xii, 2).

E. P. Boys-Smith.

Hordle Vicarage, Hants.

ST. PAUL AND WOMEN.

To the Editor of the MODERN CHURCHMAN.

SIR,

(1) St. Paul does not give as a reason for the subjection of women the good effect produced on their unbelieving husbands, as Miss E. Rodgers asserts (p. 246). This is the reason adduced by St. Peter, who also uses the words, 'Beholding your chaste behaviour,' &c., which your contributor attributes to St. Paul (*I Peter* iii, 1, 2).

(2) 'The law' to which the Apostle refers in I *Cor.* xiv, 34, is, apparently, the sentence in *Genesis* iii, 16. But this is obviously not the law to which St. Paul refers in his Epistle to the Galatians, for he says that it came 430 years after Abraham (*Gal.* iii, 17), and *a fortiore* long after Eve.

The Jews used the word 'Law' in two senses: (1) in the wider sense of the Pentateuch and (2) in the narrower sense of the statutes of the traditional Mosaic codes. It is arguable that when St. Paul refers to a legend from the earliest ages of the world, he regards it as the voice of 'Nature itself,' to which he appeals in his disciplinary regulations for the ministry of women.

X.Y.Z.

[We regret that these wrong references escaped editorial revision. In the same number of the *Modern Churchman*, p. 240, l. 25 from top, *fuller* should be read for *fallen*.—ED. *M.C.*]

A SYLLABUS OF CHILDREN'S LESSONS.

As we often receive requests for guidance in the matter of Sunday School and Bible Class Lessons, we think that the publication of the following scheme prepared by a Vicar who is highly successful as a teacher of the young, may prove useful. The Roman Catholic teacher makes full use of the Saints. It will be noticed that this syllabus does the same, but not all its Saints are in the Calendar.

ED., *M.C.*

ADVENT. PREPARATION FOR THE INCARNATION.

1. Thoughts on ourselves.
2. Thoughts on God.
3. Thoughts on how God works.
4. What hinders God's work?

CHRISTMAS. THE INCARNATION.

5. God in Man One Christ. The Sinless One.

EPIPHANY. RESPONSIBILITIES OF CHRISTIANS.

6. Needed self-discipline.
7. Needed taking a lead.
8. Needed making allowances.

SEPTUAGESIMA TO EASTER.

CHRISTIAN VIRTUES EXEMPLIFIED BY CHRISTIAN SAINTS.

9.	Renunciation.	St. Columba.
10.	Courage.	Bishop G. A. Selwyn.
11.	Courage.	Mary Slessor.
12.	Truth in thought and action.	Raymond Lull.

13.	Truth in thought and action.	St. Paul.
14.	Sympathy.	Father Dolling.
15.	Sympathy.	Florence Nightingale.
16.	Palm Sunday.	The Cross.
17.	Easter Day.	The Victory.

EASTERTIDE. The Spirit of the Risen Lord.

18.	Wisdom and Understanding.	Charles Dickens.
19.	Counsel and Strength.	Lord Shaftesbury.
20.	Knowledge.	Robert Raikes.
21.	Godliness.	Elizabeth Fry.
22.	Fear of the Lord.	Charles Kingsley.

SUNDAY AFTER THE ASCENSION.

23.	The Work of the Church.	The Work of the Risen Lord.

WHIT SUNDAY.

24.	The Holy Spirit our bond of union with the Risen Lord.	
25.	Trinity Sunday.	The Dedication of ourselves.

SUNDAYS AFTER TRINITY. The Treasury of the Nations.

26.	Hebrews.	Personal righteous, God demanding righteousness, *e.g.* The Decalogue.
27.	Greeks.	Greatness of Man. Socrates. Epictetus. St. Clement of Alexandria.
28.	Latins.	Necessity for law. Popes Leo and Gregory.
29.	English.	Freedom and tolerance. Bishop Latimer.
30.	Celtic.	Sympathy. St. Aidan.
31.	Hindoos.	Sense of the Eternal. Chundra Lela.
32.	Chinese.	Reverence for the past.
33.	Japanese.	Sense of beauty.
34.	Dark Races.	Personal Loyalty.

AUGUST HOLIDAYS. Sundays after Trinity (*continued*).

35.	Baptismal Formula and its meaning.	God is Love.
36.	Our response to that love.	I am, therefore I ought.
37.	The need of illumination.	The personal gift of the Holy Spirit.
38.	Holiness.	Separation from Sin.
39.	Harvest Festival.	Nature.
40.	God above all.	
41.	God through all.	
42.	God in all.	
43.	God's patience, impartiality, righteousness.	
44.	God in the individual.	
45.	God in Humanity.	
46.	God in Christ.	
47.	The Perfect Man.	

Published on the 15th of the month.

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THE MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

EDITOR: H. D. A. MAJOR, B.D.

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